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Nurturing Young Public Firms over Real Business Cycles. In this paper, I develop a the-
ory of financial intermediation in a general equilibrium environment, to study the interactions
between households, financial intermediation, and entrepreneurs over real business cycles. In
the model, the financial intermediary, who resembles real-life private equity (PE) groups and
investment bankers, works as a nurturer of young public firms. It performs screening and
sorting on entrepreneurs, then allocates resources to them, borrowed from the households.
However, the effort intensity in screening decreases when the financial intermediary is flooded
by resources, so do the average quality of financial services and the commission rate, which
predict the countercyclicality of those variables. This countercyclicality of efficiency in the
financial sector promises a dampening effect on economic volatility. I use the U.S. initial
public offering (IPO) data, as well as selected PE data to document that the commission
rate is indeed countercyclical. Its correlation with the cyclical component of total output
is around -0.21. I calibrate the model to the U.S. financial market and conduct several
counterfactual exercises. I find that a 20% drop in the financial intermediary’s cost of effort
dampens the total output volatility by 0.24% and the household consumption volatility by
0.53%. While a binding commission rate cap amplifies the volatility by 0.36% and 0.54%
respectively.
vii
Antitrust Policy in a Globalized Economy. Antitrust policies have been relaxed and the
number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has risen rapidly since the 1980s in the United
States. This paper provides a framework to evaluate the cost and benefits of antitrust
policy in a global context. M&A reallocate resources from small to large and typically more
productive firms, while also increasing their monopoly power. An optimal antitrust policy
seeks a balance between the positive productivity effect and the negative markup effect.
In a globalized economy, increasing productivity fully accrues to domestic firms/workers
while a higher markup only partially hurts domestic consumers. The weakening antitrust
policy since the 1980s is thus an optimal response to the increasing globalization in the same
period. We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of M&A and show that welfare,
measured as aggregate consumption/production in stationary equilibrium, is a hump-shaped
function of the antitrust policy parameter in the model. We are extending the model to an
open economy, and aim to formalize the intuition that openness to trade demands a more
lenient antitrust policy and to explore its quantitative implications for aggregate markup
and welfare.
A Model of Technology Diffusion. Many new technologies, instead of being adopted
simultaneously by all producers in the same area or industry, display a long and lagged
diffusion process, with an S-shaped adoption curve. This even applies to technologies that
were later proven to improve productivity significantly. We construct and test a model for
explaining this observation. In the model, agents who are heterogeneous in beliefs choose
their optimal stopping/adopting time, while they are learning from the output of others.
As the population of agents who are experimenting with the new technology grows up, the
learning process accelerates. Part of the incentives for them to wait is to free-ride on a larger
experimenting group in the future. Our model can explain various technology diffusion data,
such as the hybrid corn adoption in the U.S., or the adoption of the 12 industrial innovations.
viii
Chapter 1




The study of financial intermediation is an on-going research topic existed for decades. Real-
life examples of financial intermediaries, such as commercial banks, investment banks and
all kinds of investment funds, for better or for worse, have proven their importance in our
economy. It is essential for us to understand the roles of those financial intermediaries, their
impact on the economy, and what are the consequences if we put certain regulations on
them.
In this paper, I want to study financial intermediation, especially its interactions with
households and entrepreneurs over real business cycles. I focus on financial intermediaries
who help direct funds from households to startup firms, by performing screening on en-
1Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO
63130 (email: l.cao@wustl.edu).
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trepreneurs of unknown abilities. Once funded, those firms have a chance to grow large,
get public, and have substantial influences on the aggregate economy. I call those financial
intermediaries “nurturers of young public firms”.
I want to answer two major questions. Firstly, what are the cyclical patterns of those
financial intermediaries’ behaviors? By behaviors I mean investment size, effort in screen-
ing entrepreneurs, efficiency in utilizing resources, etc. To answer that, I build a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model in which the financial intermediary reacts to productiv-
ity shocks in the real sector and the financial sector promptly. Secondly, how do the cyclical
behaviors reshape business cycles? In order to answer this question, I take the theory to the
data, and use counterfactual exercises to evaluate the impact of financial intermediation on
economic volatility and welfare.
To establish connections between my theory and the existing literature, it is necessary to
briefly go through the literature of financial intermediation. Based on the natural attribute,
some early researchers, such as Gurley and Shaw (1962), Benston and Smith (1976), tended
to think of financial intermediaries as providing money transaction services. This is indeed
a major task for commercial banks since they started to exist. But the relative importance
of this task has been decreasing, even within commercial banks.
Others thought of financial intermediation as a remedy for the asymmetric information
problems between investors and firms in the economy. Financial intermediaries generate
social surplus by helping better allocate resources. As noted by Raymond W. Goldsmith
(1969, p.400), financial intermediation “improves economic performance to the extent that it
facilitates the migration of funds to the best users, i.e., to the place in the economic system
where the funds will earn the highest social return”.
Based on the frictions a financial intermediary solves when interacting with its counter-
parties, it can be performing ex-ante screening or ex-post monitoring. In the early work of
Leland-Pyle (1976), Diamond (1984), financial intermediaries were modeled as solving ex-
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ante asymmetric information problem between lenders and borrowers. The limitation is that
they were partial equilibrium analysis, so it is unlikely to say anything about the impact of
financial intermediation on the economic fundamentals.
In Baron (1982), Ritter (2003), financial intermediaries were modeled to solve the asym-
metric information problem faced by the firms about the financial market conditions. Firms
are willing to pursue intermediaries with a good reputation, even if it means that they need
to pay more. However, in those works the household side is often missing. It either appears
exogenous as a stochastic demand for goods, or a stochastic supply of capital. In this paper,
I’m following the classical ex-ante screening approach, but in an innovative way. I have an
explicitly modeled household part, who interacts with the financial intermediary actively on
different markets.
Under a grand scope, I want to develop a theory in which the following three parties and
their interactions are explicitly modeled: Households who want to invest their savings but
face uncertainty about the investment opportunities. Firms who need funds but face uncer-
tainty about the fundamentals in the aggregate financial market. Financial intermediaries
who interact with both parties and solve their asymmetric information problems. Finan-
cial intermediation would have a real impact on economic performance, that is, long-term
growth or short-term fluctuations. An important question one could ask is whether financial
intermediation dampens the economic volatility by mitigating productivity shocks, that is,
a dampening effect, or the opposite, an amplification effect.
Following Galetovic (1996), Blackbur and Hung (1998), I model financial intermediation
as a channel through which the economy funds firm innovations. In my model, entrepreneurs
need resources to industrialize their ideas. Once funded, they have a chance to create a new
variety of intermediate goods, which promises a flow of future profits. However, entrepreneurs
are heterogeneous in abilities, which determine the probability of successfully creating a
new variety of intermediate goods. The financial intermediary borrows resources from the
3
households, performs screening on the entrepreneurs, and allocates resources to them.
Screening is costly to the financial intermediary, so does borrowing resources from the
households. To maximize profit, the financial intermediary reacts optimally to the economic
fundamentals. What I care most about are the effort intensity, measured by effort in screening
per unit of investment, and the efficiency of intermediation, measure by firms created per
unit of investment. If those variables are countercyclical, we could expect a dampening
effect to appear, which is rarely achievable in general equilibrium models regarding financial
intermediation. The intuition is that in bad (good) times, the financial intermediary is more
(less) efficient in producing new varieties of intermediate goods, which mitigates the effect
of productivity shocks.
It’s worth mentioning that the amplification effect is somewhat prevailing in the literature
studying financial stability. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) talked about the fragility of the
banking system, and how it causes panic to spread during a crisis. Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) discussed how the worsening of credit conditions could
amplify negative productivity shocks originated in the real sector. Veldkamp and Wolfers
(2007) talked about coordination in information acquisition, and how it reshapes business
cycles. They emphasized on how an overly-grown financial sector could undermine economic
stability. My paper, on the other hand, is one of the few who try to shed light on the bright
side. I want to examine whether a properly regulated financial intermediation market, who
responds to business cycles promptly, can improve economic stability by reducing volatility
of the fundamentals. Another difference between their works and mine is that their works
are mainly on crisis, while mine is on regular business cycles.
In the theory part of the paper, I have established conditions under which there is a
negative correlation between the effort intensity and the investment size, especially when
the financial intermediary is flooded by resources. As a matter of fact, there exists an
endogenously determined threshold value, above which the financial intermediary’s optimal
4
effort level would stop reacting to changes in its investment size. As in most macroeconomic
models, investment size is procyclical, this negative correlation promises a countercyclical
effort intensity, as well as the intermediation efficiency. I’m able to get these interesting
qualitative results under a fairly clear and general setup. Another advantage of the model is
that it also predicts a countercyclical commission rate of the financial intermediary, which
is something I can test empirically.
To provide empirical evidence for my theory, I have done some works regarding the
cyclicality of the commission rate. I use the U.S. IPO market as a representative market,
to construct measures for investment size and commission rate. I choose the IPO market
because, in a typical IPO process, the issuing firm, the investment banker(s), and the buyer(s)
either in the primary market or the follow-up secondary market consist of a perfect example
for the theory I have developed.
The data source is SDC: Global New Issues Database. I calculate the quarterly average
commission rate of investment bankers in IPO, from 1976Q1-2016Q4. Together with eco-
nomic fundamentals calculated from the U.S. economy, I have documented two main empiri-
cal facts: 1. The quarterly number and total value of IPOs are procyclical; 2. The quarterly
average commission rate is countercyclical, both consistent with the model’s prediction. As
a robustness check, I run regressions of the commission rate on economic fundamentals con-
trolling for size, on both the quarterly average level and the individual stock level. The
countercyclicality of the commission rate remains significant.
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy. I follow the standard real business cycle
literature when calibrating parameters of the real sector and household part in the model.
I calibrate parameters of the financial sector to match moments and correlations found in
my empirical study of the U.S. IPO market, using the simulated method of moments. I’m
not using the correlation between the cyclical output and commission rate as a target in
calibration, because I want to use it to check the wellness of fit. With the calibrated model,
5
I have simulated the cyclical output, consumption, investment size, as well as the commission
rate. The correlation between the simulated cyclical output and commission rate fits the
correlation found in the data pretty well: -0.15 in simulation comparing to -0.21 in the data.
I conduct several counterfactual exercises. The first exercise is to raise (reduce) the
financial intermediary’s cost of effort by 20%. The output volatility2 increases (decreases)
by 0.14% (0.24%). The household consumption volatility increases (decreases) by 0.32%
(0.53%). The households’ welfare loss (gain) is 2.22% (3.84%).3
In the second counterfactual exercise, I put a binding4 commission rate cap on the fi-
nancial intermediary. The output volatility increases by 0.36%. The household consumption
volatility increases by 0.53%. The households’ welfare loss is 5.62%. I argue that a better
way to achieve a lower average commission rate is to reduce the market power of the financial
intermediary. In the third exercise I shut down the financial sector completely. The output
volatility increases by 0.74%. The household consumption volatility increases by 1.55%. The
households’ welfare loss is 7.03%.
The results from the counterfactual exercises demonstrate that in my model, financial
intermediation could generate a dampening effect strong enough to overcome the typical
amplification effect, and stabilize the economy.
To summarize, this paper contributes to the literature in at least three ways. In the theory
part, the paper has provided an innovative mechanism under which the effort intensity and
the intermediation efficiency of the financial intermediary are countercyclical, which promise
a dampening effect of financial intermediation on productivity shocks. In the empirical
part, the paper is one of the first to document the countercyclicality of the commission rate
of financial intermediaries. In the quantitative part, the paper has demonstrated that the
dampening effect is strong under a calibration which fits the data moments pretty well. The
2Measured by the standard deviation to mean ratio, aka the coefficient of variation.
3Around 90% is due to changes in the steady-state level of consumption.
4Much lower than the steady-state commission rate.
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paper also provides normative suggestions on how to achieve a low average commission rate.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the model and
provides qualitative results. Section 1.3 describes the data and empirical evidence. Section
1.4 discusses calibration and quantitative results. Section 1.5 Concludes.
1.2 Model
To better understand the role of financial intermediation as a nurturer of young public firms,
and the interactions between households, financial intermediary, and entrepreneurs over real
business cycles in a stochastic general equilibrium environment, I develop an infinite horizon
discrete time model with homogeneous households, a financial intermediary, heterogeneous
entrepreneurs, and aggregate uncertainty.
The households face standard consumption-saving trade-off. What’s new is that they
also face an investment portfolio choice when they save. They can invest to replenish the
capital stock, change their holdings of firms shares, or lend to the financial intermediary in
an intratemporal borrowing and lending market. The financial intermediary uses resources
borrowed from households to fund entrepreneurs. A funded entrepreneur can industrialize his
idea to create a new variety of intermediate goods, as well as a monopolistic firm producing
it, which promises a future flow of profits.
The success rate of industrialization depends on the entrepreneur’s ability. But an indi-
vidual entrepreneur’s ability is unknown to all unless it is verified. The financial intermediary
performs screening and sorting on entrepreneurs, allocates resources, and sells the success-
fully created intermediate goods firms to the households on a competitive market of firms
shares. The surplus is split into return for the households and commission fee for the financial
intermediary, either in a competitive market or through Nash bargaining, which are equiva-
lent if allowing a taxation on the financial intermediary’s profit. The aggregate uncertainty
7
is introduced through exogenous productivity shocks.
1.2.1 Final Goods
Time is discrete and infinite t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . At each period, final goods are produced















An intermediate good is indexed by its variety ω, while At is the measure of available
intermediate goods at period t. τ governs the love of variety as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
Benassy (1996). σ governs the elasticity of substitution, and is assumed to be larger than 1.
At each time t, the final goods are used as the numeraire.













Each variety of intermediate goods is produced by a single monopolistic firm. The production
of intermediate goods uses capital as the sole input and according to a concave production
function
yt(ω) = exp(εt)kαt (ω).
εt represents the contemporary aggregate productivity shock in the intermediate goods
sector, whose law of motion will be specified in the household part later. α ∈ (0, 1) governs
concavity and the capital share. An intermediate goods firm takes the demand function (1.2)
8
and the capital interest rate rt as given, and solves
πt(ω) = max
yt(ω)





where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital depreciation rate.

















And most importantly, the intermediate goods firm earns a profit πt(ω) > 0. I assume that
the profit is paid to shareholders of the firm each period as dividend. One can see that
intermediate goods firms are symmetric in this economy.
Each intermediate goods firm acts as a monopolist because it owns the patent to produce
a certain variety of intermediate goods. New varieties of intermediate goods are created
by entrepreneurs. Once funded, an entrepreneur has the chance to industrialize his idea
to create a new variety of intermediate goods, as well as a firm producing it. The newly
created firm is temporarily owned by the financial intermediary who funds the entrepreneur,
and is sold to the households right after on a competitive firm’s shares market, while the
entrepreneur gets a one-time payment for successfully industrializing his idea. One can see a
direct and intuitive connection between the process described above, and the real-life initial
public offering (IPO), private equity (PE), or investment banking. I will be more specific
about this point in the latter entrepreneur and financial intermediary part.
After finishing the current period production, all incumbent intermediate goods firms
face an exogenous death rate of η ∈ (0, 1). I define Qt as the post-dividend expected present
9


















which is derived in equation (1.20). Qt is a crucial endogenous variable for the financial
market, because it is essentially the price of a newly created intermediate goods firm in
period t. Since in this economy a new intermediate goods firm is equivalent to a new variety
of intermediate goods, I will use these two terms interchangeably later.
Now that I have described the goods production sector, it’s time to look at the three main
parties of agents in this economy. They are, entrepreneurs who have ideas and need resources.
Households who have resources and try to find users promising highest returns. The financial
intermediary who has access to a screening technology and generate social surplus by helping
better allocate resources to entrepreneurs. Figure 1.1 illustrates the interactions between the
three parties in the economy.
1.2.3 Entrepreneurs
The economy is populated by a large6 continuum of one-period lived, risk-neutral entrepreneurs,
each of whom is endowed with an idea that might be industrialized, into a new variety of
intermediate goods. Entrepreneurs require ξ > 0 amount of final goods to industrialize the
idea, but are heterogeneous in their abilities z ∈ [0, 1]. That is, an entrepreneur with ability
z, upon spending ξ units of final goods, will have a probability z to successfully create a
5The formula shall be derived from the individual household’s optimization problem. Since households
in my model are homogeneous, I use ct to denote the per capita consumption at time t, which is common
across households in equilibrium.
6By large I mean it has the same measure as the real line R, so the pool of entrepreneurs (ideas) will
never be exhausted by the financial intermediary. This point will be more clear in the financial intermediary
part.
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Figure 1.1: Interactions Between Agents in the Economy
new variety of intermediate goods. To be consistent with the pricing formula (1.4), I assume
that an intermediate goods firm created in period t survives the current period for sure, and
starts to produce in period t + 1. I will drop the subscript t from now on, because it is
irrelevant in the rest of this section.
The measure of entrepreneurs is assumed to be large, comparing to the measure of house-
holds, which is normalized to 1. I make this assumption because I believe ideas are plenty,
but the resources needed to make them realize are always constrained. The cost of indus-
trialization ξ should be thought of as an amount of resources no individual household could
afford alone. Also notice that ξ is exogenous and fixed across entrepreneurs, while in the
data we do observe entrepreneurs of different scope asking for a different amount of invest-
ment, and end up creating firms of various sizes. This assumption is a solid one in my model
though, for two reasons. First is that in the model intermediate goods firms are symmetric,
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so there is no room for “dream bigger, ask for more”. Second is that I can bring in hetero-
geneous demand for investment even under this framework, by allowing one entrepreneur
having multiple ideas. However, it complicates the model while bringing about little new
intuition.
The creation of a new intermediate goods firm is publicly observable, but I assume that
a particular entrepreneur’s ability z is unknown to all, including the entrepreneur himself,
unless verified by a financial intermediary. This serves as the main friction in the economy.
The reservation utility of the entrepreneurs is assumed to be time-invariant and normalized
to 0.7 The population distribution of entrepreneur abilities is characterized by a cumulative
distribution function H(z), which is common knowledge. Denote the population mean of




Assumption 1. The distribution of abilities H(z) has a density h(z) which satisfies
h(z) > 0, ∀z ∈ [0, 1].
This assumption is to make sure that H(z) has a well-defined inverse function on [0, 1],
and both H(z) and its inverse function are differentiable.
1.2.4 Financial Intermediary
The economy has one8 risk-neutral financial intermediary, who is assumed to be impatient.9
The financial intermediary solves a static profit maximization problem every period. It
has access to a screening technology.10 Once screened by the financial intermediary, an
7I can assume this because the entrepreneurs are not aware of their own abilities, so they are ex-ante
homogeneous.
8One could think of it as a unity of all financial intermediaries, or the financial sector.
9This assumption is to rule out intratemporal decisions of the financial intermediary such as hoarding.
One can think of the financial intermediary as being replaced by a new one every period.
10I’m not assuming that an individual household can not operate such technology. But because of the
economy of scale, the financial intermediary could operate the technology more efficiently.
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entrepreneur’s ability z becomes known to the financial intermediary and the entrepreneur
himself, but not to any other agents in the economy.
Every period, upon putting in effort level e ∈ R+, the financial intermediary screens
a measure e of entrepreneurs, randomly drawn from the population. The population of
entrepreneurs (ideas) is assumed to be so large that it can not be exhausted by the financial
intermediary.11 Screening gives the financial intermediary a pool of verified entrepreneurs,
among whom the exact mapping between individuals and abilities are known by the financial
intermediary. Sorting is thus automatic within the pool of verified entrepreneurs. Those who
are left out consist of a pool of unverified entrepreneurs, among whom the mapping between
individuals and abilities remains unknown. Since e is a positive measure and drawing is
random, both the pool of verified entrepreneurs and the pool of unverified ones should inherit
the original population distribution of abilities H(z). This turns out to be an important
property later in determining the optimal allocation rule of resources.
The screening effort is observed only by the financial intermediary, and incurs a private
cost F (e) in unit of final goods.
Assumption 2. The cost function F (e) has the following properties:
(I) F (0) = 0, F ′(0) = 0;
(II) F ′(e) > 0, F ′′(e) > 0, ∀e ∈ R++;
(III) F (e) may have a small fixed cost component.
Basically, I want the cost of screening effort to be strictly increasing and strictly convex.
The requirement for a very small fixed cost component is to guarantee an interior solution of
the optimal effort level. It is important to point out that screening is costly, but randomly
drawing entrepreneurs from the population is not. The financial intermediary can draw
cost-freely as many entrepreneurs as it wants at any time, without screening them.
11Basically, the financial intermediary can draw entrepreneurs with replacement.
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As stated in the intermediate goods production part, a variety of intermediate goods
defines a monopolistic firm. And the expected present value of a new intermediate goods
firm is Q. Remember that in this economy the entrepreneurs and the financial intermediary
are assumed to be one-period lived and myopic respectively, they don’t own any resources
or hold any firm’s shares at the beginning of a period. The households are the ultimate
provider of resources, and the only candidate for purchasing and holding intermediate goods
firms. Every period, after observing the productivity shocks, the financial intermediary
borrows X amount of final goods from the households, with a promised intratemporal return
rate R, in an intratemporal borrowing and lending market that is either competitive or
centralized. It then performs screening, and allocates resources to entrepreneurs. After the
new intermediate goods firms are created, the financial intermediary sells the ownership to
the households on a competitive firm’s shares market, and pay the promised return to the
households. The commission fee would be the difference between the value of the firms and
the return promised to the households. The rest of the section is to characterize how the
amount of intermediated investment X and the screening effort level e are determined.
The result that the intermediate goods firms are owned by various households is consistent
with what’s happening in reality. In the U.S., the shareholders of public firms are on average
highly diversified, comparing to startup firms before going public. I would think of those
public firms as intermediate goods firms in the model, while those small private firms as
ideas, solely owned by one or a few persons.
Let’s start with the simplest piece of the puzzle, the entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs are
rather passive in this economy. They can be paid at different times, but nevertheless getting
paid the reservation utility. To see this, think of an entrepreneur before being screened.
He is definitely getting paid the reservation utility because there are abundant of them in
the economy. Now think of an entrepreneur who has already been screened by the financial
intermediary, his outside option doesn’t change because this piece of information about his
14
Figure 1.2: A Timeline of Events for the Financial Intermediary
ability is not shared with any third party. The financial intermediary only needs to pay the
entrepreneurs enough to induce participation.
This setup of entrepreneurs allows for interesting extensions though. For example, imag-
ine that there exists a moral hazard problem between the financial intermediary and the
entrepreneurs. After receiving ξ amount of final goods from the financial intermediary, an
entrepreneur could use it to industrialize idea as described before, or to divert it into personal
consumption, which yields him a utility of φξ. The financial intermediary observes the out-
come of industrialization, but can’t directly control the action taken by the entrepreneur. An
optimal contract thus arises between the financial intermediary and a funded entrepreneur




erwise 0. The contract would make it incentive compatible for the entrepreneurs to use the
resources for industrialization. This simple extension is equivalent to a setup in which the
ex-ante reservation utility is φξ rather than 0.
The real interesting interaction arises between the households and the financial interme-
diary. At each period, there is an intratemporal borrowing and lending market, decentralized
or centralized, between the households and the financial intermediary. The financial inter-
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mediary makes three decisions, first it decides how much resources X to borrow from the
households. Then it decides how much effort e to put in screening entrepreneurs. At last,
it decides how to allocate resources to the entrepreneurs, verified or unverified. In funding
entrepreneurs, I assume the following concave technology
Assumption 3. With X unit of resources, the financial intermediary can fund a maximum
number of N = exp(χ)
n(X)
ξ
entrepreneurs, where χ represents the aggregate productivity
shock in the financial sector. n(X) is continuously differentiable and satisfies
(I) 0 ≤ n(X) ≤ X, ∀X ∈ [1,∞);
(II) n′(X) > 0, n′′(X) < 0, ∀X ∈ R++.
The assumption implies that there is efficiency loss as the size of intermediated investment
X gets large. This efficiency loss can be rationalized by a higher cost of bookkeeping, or as
a reduced representation of a higher cost of monitoring entrepreneurs. The introduction of
an aggregate productivity shock χ in the financial sector is for quantitative purposes. One
can also regard it as a reduced representation of variations in the cost of industrialization:
exp(−χ)ξ. Given χ, there is a one-to-one mapping between how much resources to be
allocated X and how many entrepreneurs to be funded N . Since the financial intermediary
makes decisions after observing the productivity shocks, later on I will treat the decision of
X and the decision of N as equivalent.
Now that I have described the technologies available for the financial intermediary, it’s
time to specify the market structure in the financial sector, that is, the firm’s shares market
and the intratemporal borrowing and lending market. I assume that the firm’s shares market
is competitive. The financial intermediary is a price-taker even though it supplies a positive
measure of firms.12 As for the intratemporal borrowing and lending market, I assume that it
also operates competitively each period, for the financial intermediary to borrow resources
12This assumption is to rule out strategic behaviors of the financial intermediary when supplying newly
created firms to the market.
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from the households. The return rate R serves as the price. Since it is an intratemporal
market with no other frictions, the households’ supply of resources is perfectly elastic.13
The financial intermediary takes the price of firms Q and the return rate to households
R as given, and maximizes its profit (consumption) after observing the productivity shocks.
I denote the number of firms created as S, and give the maximization problem
max
X,e,allocation rule
Q • S(X, e, allocation rule)− F (e)−R • X. (1.5)
To solve the problem, I break it into three steps, one for each decision the financial
intermediary has to make. Let’s start with the resource allocation rule. For any given size of
entrepreneurs to be funded N14 and screening effort level e, the financial intermediary would
want to choose an allocation rule that maximizes the number of new firms created. The
space of all feasible allocation rules is huge, and can not be summarized by a finite number
of variables. Fortunately, each allocation rule maps into a distribution of abilities of those
entrepreneurs who are funded, which I can use to calculate the number of firms created.
Moreover, I’m going to argue that the optimal allocation rule is essentially a threshold rule.
The financial intermediary first utilize the pool of verified entrepreneurs. It should start with
verified entrepreneurs of the highest ability, then gradually go down as those are exhausted,
until reaching the natural lower bound E(z). If there were any resources left, the financial
intermediary should tend to the pool of unverified entrepreneurs, who promises an average
success rate of E(z). That is, entrepreneurs whose ability is verified to be worse than the




ratio that determines who gets funded, which is also a measure of “effort
13That is, when the return rate is less (more) than 1, an individual household supplies resources of quantity
0 (up to its income). When the return rate is 1, the household is indifferent between how much resources to
supply.
14I’m solving the optimal allocation rule for any given N instead of X because firstly they are equivalent,
secondly using N gives me neat analytical results.
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intensity”. To understand why the population mean E(z) serves as the natural lower bound,
remember when screening entrepreneurs, the drawing is random. So both the verified pool
and the unverified pool inherit the original population distribution of abilities H(z). To
summarize the allocation rule I have just described in a more rigorous way, I give the following
definition.










≥ N , only the pool of
verified entrepreneurs is in use. Verified entrepreneurs whose ability is above threshold z






Otherwise, both the pools of verified and unverified entrepreneurs are in use. Verified
entrepreneurs whose ability is above E(z) shall be funded, the remaining resources go to
unverified, randomly drawn entrepreneurs.
With the explanation above, the proof of why this descending allocation rule is the
optimal allocate rule which maximizes the number of firms created for any given N and e
should be straightforward. The threshold z is a decreasing function of N and an increasing
function of e, which has a closed-form representation






The optimal allocation rule is essentially a threshold rule among the verified entrepreneurs,
but with the twist that some resources might also go to unverified entrepreneurs. The
effective ability threshold is given by






Following the descending allocation rule described in Definition 1, I can derive the number





























which I call the “success function”. Detailed derivation can be found in Appendix 1.6.1.
Several things to notice about S(N, e). It is continuous in N and e but demonstrates two
regions. When e is small, the verified entrepreneurs whose ability is above the population
mean won’t be enough to exhaust all the resources. Part of the resources will be allocated to
randomly drawn, unverified entrepreneurs. In that case, the benefit of a higher effort level
is on the extensive margin, that is, a reallocation of resources from unverified entrepreneurs
back to the verified and qualified ones. This benefit shall be constant and large. However,
when e is large enough, verified and qualified entrepreneurs will exhaust all the funds. So
the benefit is on the intensive margin, namely from an improved reallocation among those
verified and qualified entrepreneurs. And this benefit shall be diminishing. To be more
specific about the shape of S(N, e), I give the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the success function S(N, e) is continuously differen-


















The fact that S(N, e) is strictly increasing in e makes it a perfect signal of the otherwise
hidden effort level. The curvature of S(N, e) implies a constant marginal benefit of effort





) , and a decreasing marginal benefit
of effort when above. In addition, a change of N moves the effort cutoff around, but has
15Being linear means S
(
ϕN1 + (1− ϕ)N2, ϕe1 + (1− ϕ)e2
)
= ϕS(N1, e1) + (1− ϕ)S(N2, e2), ∀ϕ ∈ (0, 1).




> ϕS(N1, e1)+(1−ϕ)S(N2, e2), ∀ϕ ∈ (0, 1).
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different effects on the marginal benefit of effort below or above the cutoff. To summarize
rigorously, I given the following corollary.
Corollary 2. The marginal benefit of effort, measured by Q • Se(N, e), has the following
properties:







weakly decreasing in e. To be more specific, it is constantly at the upper bound when e is
below the cutoff, and is strictly decreasing once e exceeds the cutoff;
(II) An increase of N does not affect the marginal benefit of effort on its constant region,
but enlarges the constant region. It shifts up the marginal benefit of effort on the decreasing
region;
(III) An increase of Q shifts up the marginal benefit of effort proportionally everywhere.
The proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 is given in Appendix 1.6.2. These properties
about the marginal benefit of effort, Q • Se(N, e), are crucial when determining the optimal
effort level. They also carry the intuition of why e does not respond to N if it is too large.
So far I have introduced the optimal rule of allocating resources to the entrepreneurs for
any given funded entrepreneurs’ size N , or equivalently, intermediated investment size X,
and effort level e. I have also established the properties of the success function S(N, e), which
measures the number of firms created under the optimal allocation rule. I give the following
profit maximization problem, which is updated from the original profit maximization problem
(1.5) using the optimal allocation rule.
max
X,e







In Proposition 1, I have established the concavity of the S(N, e) function. The objective
function in maximization problem (1.5’) is strictly concave as long as F (e) is strictly convex
and n(X) is strictly concave, which are guaranteed by Assumption 2 and 3 respectively. The
maximization problem yields a unique solution of the optimal borrowing size X∗ and the
optimal effort level e∗, which are characterized by the following first order conditions




Q • Se(N, e) = F
′(e), (1.9)




of firms created is
S∗ = S(N∗, e∗). (1.10)
The commission fee for the financial intermediary is
M∗ = Q • S∗ −R • X∗, (1.11)
while the profit (consumption) of the financial intermediary is
M∗ − F (e∗).
As has been discussed in the introduction part of the paper, what I care most about in the







. I refer to it as the “effort intensity”, and this ratio measures how hard the financial







. I refer to it as the “average ability of funded entrepreneurs”, or as
the “average quality of financial services”. This ratio measures the financial intermediary’s
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efficiency in turning input (final goods) into output (intermediate goods firms). The last one
is the commission-to-value ratio, measured by
M∗
Q • S∗
. And it is the “commission rate” which
we could observe from the data.16
From the first order conditions (1.8) and (1.9), one can see the optimal borrowing size
and effort level are functions of Q and χ. Using simple comparative statics, one can check
that X∗(Q,χ) is strictly increasing in Q and χ, while e∗(Q,χ) is strictly increasing in Q but
not necessarily in χ. Generally speaking, X∗ and e∗ are moved around by Q and χ across
the cycles. With different values of Q and realizations of χ, there could be two scenarios.









I’m particularly interested in this scenario because it lays the foundation of achieving a
negative correlation between the optimal effort intensity
e∗
X∗
and the borrowing size X∗.
More specifically, I’m going to show that if in equilibrium (1.12) is met, e∗(Q,χ) = e∗(Q).
To take a closer look at the scenario above, I further break the maximization problem
(1.5’) into two steps. First, the financial intermediary chooses the effort level e while taking
N as given, that is
max
e
Q • S(N, e)− F (e),
which yields an effort policy function e(N). Then it chooses the optimal borrowing size X∗,











−R • X (1.5’’)
16An alternative measure of commission rate is the commission-to-size ratio
M∗
X∗














The eventual optimal effort level would be e∗ = e(N∗).
The properties of the e(N) function are crucial for understanding why when X (or equiv-
alently N) is large, the effort intensity necessarily drops. I give the following theorem
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1 and 2, for any given Q, there exists a threshold value





) at N̄(Q) and












In addition, the threshold value N̄(Q) is strictly increasing in Q.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix 1.6.3. Much to be said about this effort
policy function. The function is continuous but with kink points at N = N̄(Q). And it
is bounded above when N increases, which indicates that a larger size of investment won’t
necessarily induce a higher level of screening effort. As a matter of fact, when flooded by
resources, the financial intermediary will only screen a fixed amount of entrepreneurs, and
allocate the excessive resources to randomly drawn, unverified ones. More specifically, When
N < N̄(Q), the intersection of Q • Se(N, e) and F ′(e) must yield an effort level e above
the effort cutoff, so only the verified entrepreneurs are funded. But once N > N̄(Q), the









the “excess region” of X.
From the first order conditions (1.8) and (1.9), one can see that χ affects the optimal
effort level e∗ only ifN affects (1.9). Based on Theorem 3, I conclude if the optimal borrowing
size X∗ is such that N∗ > N̄ , the optimal effort level e∗ = e(N∗) is constant w.r.t. χ, and
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Figure 1.3: The e(N) Function with Different Values of Q




























we are in the scenario specified by (1.12). An increase of X∗ or N∗ due to χ will necessarily
reduce the effort intensity. This sheds light on the countercyclicality of the effort intensity,
as well as the average quality of financial services and the commission rate. In data, as well
as predicted by my model, the size of aggregate investment is highly procyclical. In booms
(recessions), households invest more (less) in general, they also invest more (less) through
the financial intermediary. So a negative correlation between the investment size and the
effort intensity is essential for achieving the countercyclicality of those variables. On the




and X∗ remains ambiguous. So we should expect the countercyclical
pattern to be more prominent during booms, cause X∗ is more likely to stay in the excess
region.
I have proved the existence of an excess region, and established the fact that the opti-
mal effort level doesn’t vary with the financial sector productivity shock when the optimal
borrowing size lies in that region. However, both e∗ and X∗ are still moved around by the
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price of firms Q across the cycles. The intuition behind is straightforward, if the value of
an intermediate goods firm gets higher, the financial intermediary should react with a larger
investment size, and put more effort into screening entrepreneurs. As in most macro-asset
pricing models, Q is procyclical. So to guarantee the countercyclicality of the effort intensity,
the average quality financial services, and the commission rate, I need two conditions: 1.
The steady-state X∗ss is on its excess region; 2. e∗(Q) is less sensitive to Q comparing with




fortunately, I couldn’t provide a more precise characterization regarding condition 2 without
further specifying some functional forms.
I have described the determination of the optimal allocation rule, borrowing size, and
screening effort level, under a setup which is as general as possible. I have also elaborated
on the mechanism through which a negative correlation between the effort intensity and the
investment size could be generated. To provide more analytical results, I need to specify the
functional forms of F (e) and n(X).17
Assumption 4. The cost function has the following form
F (e) = 1{e > 0}f 0 + f
1 + κ
e1+κ; κ > 0.
And the fixed cost component f 0 is very small.
The technology of handling resources has the following form
n(X) = Xλ; λ ∈ (0, 1).
17What I need is that F ′(e) is more elastic compared to
1
n′(X)
. Using the following functional forms, this







Functional forms specified in Assumption 4 are chosen to be consistent with Assumption
2 and 3, and being easy to handle. The requirement of a large enough κ is to guarantee that
F ′(e) more elastic than
1
n′(X)
. Suppose the optimal X∗ and e∗ are indeed such that (1.12)

































h(z)dz is a constant determined solely by the population
distribution of abilities H(z).
















Which is more likely to happen in booms cause both Q and χ are procyclical.
Now I can check the ratios, what move them around in equilibrium are the price of firms
Q and the financial sector productivity shock χ. Let’s start with the effort-to-size ratio, or



















































which indicates a negative correlation between
e∗
X∗
and Q, so are
e∗
N∗
and Q. Also notice






are negatively correlated with χ
as well.
Now let’s check the success-to-size ratio, or the “average quality of financial services”.
Remember that when (1.12) is met,
S∗ = e∗ • ∆H(z) +N
∗ • E(z).
And one can check
N∗
X∗







negatively correlated with Q and χ.











And one can check
Q • e∗
X∗
is decreasing in Q and χ, while
Q • N∗
X∗




is also negatively correlated with Q and χ.
As I have mentioned previously, the price of firms is higher when the economy experi-
ences a positive productivity shock in the intermediate goods sector. Meanwhile, a positive
productivity shock in the financial sector boosts up future output. These two facts, together
with the properties discussed above, promise the countercyclicality of those ratios.
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So far, I have laid out the setup of the financial sector and established conditions under
which the effort intensity, the average quality of financial services and the commission rate
are countercyclical. However, there is a shortage to this competitive setup. That is, one
can not vary the “market power” or profit of the financial intermediary easily because both
the supply of resources and the demand for firm’s shares are perfectly elastic. It causes
problems for me to take the model to the data. That is why I have introduced an alternative
centralized setup in Appendix 1.6.4, in which the market power of the financial intermediary
is varied by its bargaining power γ in a Nash bargaining with the households. I have also
established the equivalence between these two setups. What I need in the competitive setup
is to add a taxation on the financial intermediary’s profit, and use it to compensate the
households with a lump-sum transfer
T = (1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax rate
[
Q • S(N∗, e∗)− F (e∗)−R • X∗
]
.
This taxation scheme has a pure redistribution effect in the sense that it won’t affect any
participants’ incentives in the financial sector.
1.2.5 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived, risk-averse, and homogeneous
households, whose measure is normalized to 1. Households own the capital stock and the
stock of intermediate goods firms in the economy. Each period, an individual household’s
wealth consists of the rent and value from holding capital stock kt, the pre-dividend value
of holding intermediate goods firm’s shares at, and a lump-sum transfer Tt. It then decides
how much to consume ct, how much capital stock kt+1 and intermediate goods firm’s shares
at+1 to take to the next period, and how much xht to lend to the financial intermediary in the
intratemporal borrowing and lending market. I denote sht as the net change in an individual
28
household’s holding of firm’s shares.18 The households make decisions after observing the
contemporary productivity shocks εt, χt.
An individual household is a price-taker in the financial markets and the capital renting
market. The household’s utility from consumption is u(c), satisfying u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0,
and lim
c→0
u′(c) = ∞, with time discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). I give the individual household’s







s.t. ∀t and realization of the productivity shocks εt, χt
ct + kt+1 +Qtat+1 = (1 + rt)kt +
[
πt + (1− η)Qt
]
at + (Rt − 1)xht + Tt, (1.13)
xht ≤ (1 + rt)kt +
[















ct, kt+1, at+1 ≥ 0. (1.16)
As a reminder, εt represents the contemporary productivity shock in the intermediate
goods sector, χt represents the contemporary productivity shock in the financial sector,
while νt+1 and µt+1 are Gaussian white noises with constant standard deviations. Tt is a
lump-sum transfer from taxation on the financial intermediary’s profit, which mimics the
18I use non-capital letters for the individual household’s optimization variables, and capital letters for the
aggregate variables. To distinguish from their counterparts in the financial intermediary’s profit maximiza-
tion, I add a superscript “h” to both the net purchase of firm’s shares sht and the supply of resources in the
intratemporal borrowing and lending market xht .
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results of a Nash bargaining between the unity of households and the financial intermediary.
The optimization states that at each period t, after the realization of the productivity
shocks, an individual household takes the contemporary interest rate of capital rt, the profit
of intermediate goods firms πt, the price of newly created or survived incumbent intermediate
goods firms Qt, and the return rate of lending to the financial intermediary Rt as given,
and maximizes its life-long expected utility, subject to the budget constraint (1.13), an
resource constraint (1.14), the evolution of aggregate productivity shocks (1.15), and the
non-negativity constraint (1.16). As usual, net investment into the capital stock is defined
by
it = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt. (1.17)
Net purchase of firm’s shares is defined by
sht = at+1 − (1− η)at. (1.18)
In order to understand the necessity of the resource constraint (1.14), remember that
the financial market for borrowing and lending between the financial intermediary and the
households operates intratemporarily. That implies each household has a perfectly elastic
supply function of resources. It is necessary for me to put a natural upper bound for how
much an individual household could afford to lend, which in this case is the total wealth a
household owns. In equilibrium, though, both the total and per-capita size of borrowing and
lending shall be determined by the demand side as in equation (1.8) and (1.9), and (1.14)
will never be binding.















πt+1 + (1− η)Qt+1
)]
, (1.20)
Rt = 1. (1.21)
They are the non-arbitrage conditions for investment into the capital stock, investment
into the shares of firms, and lending to the financial intermediary respectively. Equation
(1.20) provides the foundation for the pricing equation (1.4). To see it is the non-arbitrage
condition for firm’s shares, notice what’s on the left hand side is the cost of purchasing one
unit share of firms today, and what’s on the right is the expected return of owning one unit
share of firms tomorrow, they must be equalized in equilibrium.
1.2.6 Aggregation and the Equilibrium
The aggregation of the economy is straightforward.19 Since the measure of households is
normalized to 1, I have








t , Kt = kt, At = at.
I close the economy with the final goods market clearing condition




t = Yt, (1.22)







dω = Kt, (1.23)
19I use capital letters to denote the aggregate variables and non-capital letters to denote the per-capita
variables.
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I give the following definition of equilibrium of the economy, see a full characterization
of it in Appendix 1.6.6.
Definition. A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium of the economy is a set of state-
dependent prices, aggregate variables, and individual variables
{
rt, pt, Qt, Rt︸ ︷︷ ︸
prices
; Kt, At, εt, χt︸ ︷︷ ︸
state variables





















solve the intermediate goods firm’s problem;










solve the individual financial intermediary’s problem;
Given rt, Qt and Rt,
{




solve the individual household’s problem.
The rest of the variables are pinned down by corresponding equations. Aggregate state vari-
ables evolve according to their law of motions. All the aggregation and market clearing
conditions are met.
1.3 Data and Empirical Evidence
I choose the U.S. initial public offering (IPO) market as a representative market for testing my
theory. The IPO market fits my model of financial intermediation well for several reasons.
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Firstly, an IPO is typically when the former private shareholders of the firm are getting
paid, and it is a necessary prerequisite for the firm’s shares to be traded publicly among
households. Secondly, unlike other real-life intermediation activities that may take years to
process and mature, the IPO is usually more time-sensitive and prompt to changes in the
economic conditions. Thirdly, the commission fee of the investment bankers helping issue
IPO is affected by the expectation of the quality of the issuing firm, as well as the long-term
performance of its stock. So as in the model, the commission rate of the investment bankers
should contain information about their effort intensity, as well as the quality of services they
provide.
One more thing to clarify before going to details of the data. I call the IPO market a
“representative market” in the sense that those investment bankers are part of the financial
intermediary I have in the model. Thus the commission fee they get should also be a portion
of what’s in the model. I’m assuming that the portion is fixed, so I can still calculate the
correlations of variables precisely, but not the levels. This is why in the quantitative part,
I’m only going to use the correlations of variables found in the data, instead of their levels.
The data source for the U.S. IPO market is the SDC: Global New Issues Database. For
what I need, it provides: issue date, gross spread amount,20 principal amount,21 offer price,
type of the security, etc. I’m only looking at IPOs in the U.S. market, issued by U.S. firms
and issuing common stocks,22 between 01/01/1976 and 12/31/2016. There are 11509 stocks
with all the information needed available. I choose the U.S. market because related studies
show that investment bankers in the U.S. have been frequently colluding since the 70s, to
avoid price competition. They as a group has certain monopoly power, so I don’t need to
worry about large changes in market power over time.
To document their correlations with the economic fundamentals, I construct quarterly
20The total amount of money paid to the investment bankers.
21One commonly accepted measure of the total value of an IPO.
22This includes common stock, ordinary stock, class A stock, and class B stock.
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time series of the aggregate value, number, and commission rate23 of IPOs. For each quarter




Principal Amountit × Inflation Adjustmentt,
which maps to Qt • S∗t . The principal amount measures the value of a firm on its offering
price, that is, the value in the primary market. I regard it as a fair price paid to obtain the
ownership of the firm. The inflation adjustment is constructed using CPI (1=2010$). As in
the model, I denote the quarterly total number of IPOs as S∗t .








which is a measure of the average commission fee paid to the investment bankers per unit
value of IPO issued within the quarter.
I construct two variables as economic fundamentals. The first one is the cyclical compo-
nent of real GDP. I take an HP filter with smoothing parameter 1600 on the log of quarterly





second one is the unemployment rate. I construct a quarterly series of unemployment rate
urt by taking average of the BLS monthly data.24
From the table 1.1, one can see that the quarterly total value of IPO is procyclical,
while the quarterly average commission rate is countercyclical, consistent with the model’s
prediction. The quarterly total number of IPO is acyclical, this is because the quarterly
average value of IPO is highly procyclical.
23Speaking from an accounting point of view, the total payment that investment bankers receive from IPO
includes not only just commission fee. But for simplicity, I call all those payments commission fee in this
paper.
24Civilian unemployment rate (U-3), seasonally adjusted.
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Table 1.1: Correlations between Variables of Interest
Correlation Cyclical GDP (lnyct ) Unemployment Rate (urt)
Commission Rate (acmrt) -0.21 0.24
Total Value (valuet) 0.15 -0.01
Total Number (S∗t ) 0.06 0.04
The IPO literature states that an individual IPO’s commission rate is negatively cor-
related with its value. For example, in Chen and Ritter (2000), Ritter (2003), they ran
regressions of the individual IPO’s commission rate on value, as well as other firm-specific
characteristics. The coefficient of the individual value term is always negative and signifi-






This is a measure of the value of a representative IPO issued within the quarter, and it maps
to Qt in the model.
I further divide those 11509 stocks into two subgroups: information-creating (I) group
and non-information-creating (NI) group. The division is based on three key factors: 1. The
offer price; 2. The primary market where the stock is listed or traded; 3. The firm’s main
business. The idea behind the division is to get rid of the “penny stocks”, which are not
traded publicly even after their IPOs. I put them in the NI group and use it as a control
group. Detailed selection criteria can be found in Appendix 1.6.7, and I end up with 7605
information-creating stocks and 3904 non-information-creating stocks.
I run OLS regressions of the quarterly average commission rate on the quarterly average
value, and each of the fundamentals, as shown in table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Regression Results on the Quarterly Average Level
Dep. Var.: acmr, information-creating group, 1976Q1-2016Q425
(1) (2) (3)




R2 0.54 0.54 0.55
NO. 163 163 163
[p < 0.05(∗), p < 0.01(∗∗), p < 0.001(∗ ∗ ∗)]
Dep. Var.: acmr, non-information-creating group, 1976Q1-2016Q426
(1) (2) (3)




R2 0.46 0.46 0.46
NO. 163 163 163
[p < 0.05(∗), p < 0.01(∗∗), p < 0.001(∗ ∗ ∗)]
The regression results show that the average commission rate in the information-creating
group is countercyclical even after controlling for the average value of IPO. While its coun-
terpart in the non-information-creating group doesn’t show such a pattern. As a robustness
check, I’ve also run regressions with individual stocks rather than the quarterly aggregates,
the cyclical patterns stay the same. Regression results regarding individual stocks are pro-
vided in Appendix 1.6.8.
To summarize, I have documented the fact that in the U.S. IPO market, the total value of
IPO is procyclical, while the commission rate of investment bankers is countercyclical, even
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after controlling for the average or individual IPO value. These empirical results, especially
the correlations are consistent with my model’s prediction, and will be used in the following
quantitative part of the paper.
1.4 Quantitative Results
In Section 1.2, I lay out the model and provide several important qualitative results regarding
the correlation between the optimal effort intensity (effort-to-size ratio) and the investment
size. Most importantly, I have established the existence of an “excess region” of the in-
vestment size. In that region, the effort intensity, the average quality of financial services
(success-to-size ratio), and the commission rate (commission-to-size ratio) are all negatively
correlated with the investment size. The negative correlation implies a countercyclical effi-
ciency of the financial intermediary in utilizing resources, which lays the foundation of the
dampening effect that I’m about to examine quantitatively in the current section.
To take the theory to the data, I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, including
the correlation between the cyclical GDP and the investment size documented in Section
1.3. I want to check how much the calibrated model can explain the documented correlation
between the cyclical GDP and the commission rate. I also conduct several counterfactual
exercises, to show that the financial intermediary’s cyclical behavior in exerting screening
effort helps reduce the output and household consumption volatility, thus a dampening effect.
Let’s start with a specification of functional forms for the remaining functions.
1.4.1 Model Specification
I have specified the functional forms for the cost of screening effort F (e) and the technology
of handling resources n(X) in Assumption 4. To proceed, I need to specify the population
distribution of abilities H(z), and the household’s utility function u(c).
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Assumption 5. (Functional Form Specification)




; ψ > 0.
That is, I assume a uniform distribution of abilities and a constant relative risk aversion
utility function. The distribution function is consistent with Assumption 1. I use these
specifications because they allow for closed-form solutions. The main qualitative results
would remain with other specifications.






, z(N, e) = 1 − N
e
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The marginal benefit of effort is


















One can check that these two equations are consistent with what has been described in
Proposition 1 and Corollary 2.
Using the first order condition Q • Se(N, e) = F ′(e), I can solve for the effort policy
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κ . One can check that e(N) is consistent





λ . Different from N̄(Q) though, X̄(Q) is increasing in Q but
decreasing in χ, so the cyclicality of X̄(Q) is ambiguous.
Again, suppose the equilibrium X∗ and e∗ are such that
e∗
N∗















And the condition under which
e∗
N∗















The equilibrium X∗ and e∗ in the other scenario, namely when
e∗
N∗
> 2, can be solved
numerically from the first order conditions (1.8) (1.9). Unfortunately, they don’t have a
closed-form solution like the ones here.
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Table 1.3: Benchmark Calibration
Param Value Target
Firms
α 0.38 capital share
δ 0.012 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
η 0.02 BDS statistics
σ 6 average markup
τ 0 equilibrium stability
Households
β 0.987 Cooley and Prescott (1995)
ψ 2 literature
Shocks
std(ν) 1.3× 10−5 std GDP
ρ11 0.71 autocorr GDP
std(µ) 2.7× 10−5 corr GDP & IPO size
ρ22 0.68 autocorr IPO size
ρ12, ρ21 0 no structural corr
Intermediary
γ 0.03 IPO commission rate
ξ 9.72 S&P 500 P/B ratio
κ 0.59 higher moments
λ 0.82 profit rate
f 10.30 higher moments
f 0 0 set
1.4.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy, as well as some important correlations found
in the empirical part of the paper. I have in total of 19 parameters to calibrate. Among
those some I calibrate to match the long-term mean of the economy, some I calibrate jointly
using the simulated method of moments. To be consistent with the real business cycle
literature, parameters are calibrated on the quarterly frequency. Here is a table for my
current benchmark calibration.
For the firm’s part, I calibrate the concavity parameter α to match the long-term average
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capital share calculated for the U.S. economy. I take the capital depreciate rate δ from
Cooley and Prescott (1995). I calibrate the death rate of incumbent intermediate goods
firms η to match the quarterly average death rate of firms reported by the BDS statistics.
I calibrate the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods σ to match the long-
term average markup, calculated for the U.S. economy in another working paper of mine:
“Antitrust Policy in a Globalized Economy”. At last, I set the love of variety parameter τ
to be 0 because the model won’t have a stable equilibrium with a large τ .
For the household’s part, I take the time discount factor β from Cooley and Prescott
(1995), and the risk aversion parameter ψ from the literature.
For the productivity shock in the intermediate goods sector, I calibrate the standard de-
viation of the white noise ν and the self-persistence parameter ρ11 jointly, using the simulated
method of moments, to match the standard deviation and autocorrelation of the cyclical real
GDP. For the productivity shock in the financial sector, I calibrate the standard deviation of
the white noise µ and the self-persistence parameter ρ22 jointly, using the simulated method
of moments, to match the correlation between the cyclical real GDP and the quarterly total
size of IPO found in table 1.1, and the autocorrelation of the quarterly total size of IPO.27
I set the cross-persistence parameters ρ12 = ρ21 = 0 because I want to rule out structural
correlations between productivity shocks in different sectors.
For the financial intermediary’s part, I calibrate the taxation (bargaining weight) param-
eter γ to match the 7% average commission rate in the U.S. IPO market. I calibrate the cost
of industrialization ξ to match the average S&P 500 “Price-to-Book” ratio.28 The calibra-
tion for the concavity parameter λ in the technology of handling resources, and parameters
governing the cost of effort κ and f , is still work in progress. I set the fixed cost of effort
27Notice that when it comes to the statistics of the IPO market, I use only normalized terms: correlation,
autocorrelation, instead of levels such as standard deviation. I have explained the reason in the empirical




can be regarded as the “Price-to-Book” ratio.
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f 0 = 0 and it is a trivial parameter in my model.
Under the benchmark calibration, I have solved the model numerically, and simulated
time series of cyclical GDP Y , investment size X∗, effort level e∗, commission fee M∗, etc.
I’m particularly interested in how well the calibrated model can explain the documented
correlation between the cyclical real GDP and the commission rate.
Table 1.4: Simulated Correlations under the Benchmark
Correlation with Y M∗/X∗ e∗/X∗ S∗/X∗ C
Simulation -0.16 -0.18 -0.33 0.74
Data -0.21 n/a n/a 0.76
The simulated correlation between the cyclical real GDP and the commission rate ex-
plains 71% of the correlation documented in the data. The model also provides simulated
correlations regarding the effort intensity and the financial intermediary’s efficiency in uti-
lizing resources, which are difficult to observe directly from the data.29
At last, to examine whether the financial intermediary’s cyclical behavior in exerting
screening effort helps dampen the economic volatility, I conduct several counterfactual exer-
cises.
Table 1.5: Counterfactual Results under the Benchmark
Counterfactual Y Volatility C Volatility Household Welfare
Vary F (e)
20% 0.14% 0.32% -2.22%
-20% -0.24% -0.53% 3.84%
Commission Rate Cap 0.36% 0.54% -5.62%
Shut Down Intermediary 0.74% 1.55% -7.03%
29There is hope in measuring S∗ by the long-term performance of the firms after IPO. I’m working on it
as an extension of the empirical exercises of the paper.
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As shown in table 1.5, in the first counterfactual exercise, I raise (reduce) the financial
intermediary’s cost of effort by 20%. The output volatility30 increases (decreases) by 0.14%
(0.24%). The household consumption volatility increases (decreases) by 0.32% (0.53%). In
addition, the households’ welfare loss (gain) is 2.22% (3.84%).31
As for the second exercise, I put a binding32 commission rate cap on the financial inter-
mediary. The output volatility increases by 0.36%. The household consumption volatility
increases by 0.54%. And the households’ welfare loss is 5.62%. Based on this counterfactual
exercise, I argue that it is inefficient to drive down the commission rate level by using a price
cap. A better way is to introduce competition to the financial market, which is equivalent
to reducing γ in the model.
Lastly, I shut down the financial intermediary completely by setting e ≡ 0 and γ = 0.
The output volatility increases by 0.74%. The household consumption volatility increases
by 1.55%. And the households’ welfare loss is 7.03%. From the counterfactual exercises,
I conclude that the cyclical patterns of the financial intermediary’s behaviors, especially
its effort intensity in screening entrepreneurs, help dampen the volatility of output and
household consumption, and improve welfare.
The values of λ, κ and f are not calibrated yet, and I simply pick ad hoc numbers to put
in the benchmark calibration table. From the closed-form solutions of X∗ and e∗, one can
make the conjecture that κ shall largely affect the dampening effect found in the previous
counterfactual exercises. Eventually, I will calibrate those parameters to the data. But for
now, let me do a robustness check with a much higher κ = 3. The corresponding simulation
and counterfactual results can be found in Appendix 1.6.9.
30Measured by the standard deviation to mean ratio, aka the coefficient of variation, because the variable’s
mean changes a lot too.
31The welfare changes are mainly (around 90%) due to changes in the steady-state level of consumption.
32The cap is set to be 3%, which matches the commission rate level in the European IPO market, and is
much lower than the model’s steady-state commission rate level.
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1.5 Conclusion
Financial intermediation helps direct funds to its best uses. Financial intermediaries’ re-
actions to changes in the economic fundamentals over business cycles may in turn reshape
the cycles. What are the cyclical patterns of the financial intermediaries’ behaviors? Such
as their investment size, effort in screening entrepreneurs (ideas), efficiency in utilizing re-
sources, etc. To answer this question, I develop a theory of financial intermediation under
a stochastic general equilibrium framework. Given the cyclical patterns of the financial in-
termediaries’ behaviors, how would they reshape business cycles? To answer the second
question, I take the model to the data and conduct quantitative analysis. Let me summarize
the main results here.
The paper provides new findings and perspectives in theory, empirical evidence, and
quantitative analysis. In terms of theory, I build an innovative model of financial intermedi-
ation over business cycles to show that there could exist a dampening effect of the financial
intermediary. The dampening effect is originated from the financial intermediary’s optimal
behaviors over the cycles. Under certain conditions, the financial intermediary’s effort inten-
sity in screening entrepreneurs is negatively correlated with its investment size. This results
in a higher (lower) efficiency in utilizing resources in bad (good) times. It also implies that
the commission rate of the financial intermediary should be higher (lower) in booms (reces-
sions). I’m able to deliver these qualitative results under a fairly general setup, which can
be applied to many more specialized applications.
In the empirical part, I have examined one application of the model: the cyclicality of
the commission rate. I have documented the fact that the commission rate for investment
bankers in the U.S. IPO market is countercyclical, which is consistent with my model’s
prediction. This indicates that, on average, they put more effort into screening startup firms
and get paid more per unit of investment in recessions, which helps the economy to recover.
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As for the quantitative analysis, after calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, I have
shown that The cyclical behaviors of the financial intermediary help dampen the volatility of
output, household consumption, and improve household welfare. A 20% drop in the financial
intermediary’s cost of effort reduces the output volatility and the household consumption
volatility by 0.24%, 0.53% respectively. The households’ welfare gain is 3.84%. I have also
shown that price-cap is an inefficient way of reducing the level of commission fee, a better
way could be introducing more competition to the financial market.
A natural extension of the model is to introduce a more active entrepreneur part. For
example, I’m trying to add a labor market into the model, and the workers choose between
working in an intermediate goods firm or becoming an entrepreneur to produce ideas. The
main difficulty is tractability since it raises a nontrivial principal-agent problem between the




1.6.1 Deriving the Success Function







< N , in this scenario the pool of verified entrepreneurs is not enough to






many verified entrepreneurs will
get funded, and the rest are randomly drawn, unverified entrepreneurs. This result in an
aggregate number of success as





















h(z)dz +N • E(z).






≥ N , where all resources go to the verified












, which is higher than E(z) in this scenario,
and the resulted aggregate number of success is





1.6.2 Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2
Let’s start by deriving the first order partial derivatives of S(N, e). Under Assumption 1, I

















For notational purpose, I define
EL =
{
(N, e) ∈ R2+





(N, e) ∈ R2+
∣∣∣∣∣ eN > 11−H(E(z))
}
.























































) , z(N, e) +−→ E(z). This indicates that both SN(N, e) and Se(N, e)
are continuous on R2+, so S(N, e) is continuously differentiable on R2+. In addition, since
SN(N, e) > 0 and Se(N, e) > 0, S(N, e) is strictly increasing in both N and e on R2+.
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From those partial derivatives one can conclude that S(N, e) is linear on EL. To see that
it is strictly concave on EH , for an arbitrary vector (x1, x2) ∈ R2,
SNNx
2























That is, the Hessian matrix of S(N, e) is negative definite except for a measure 0 of points,
which proves its strict concavity. Proposition 1 proved.
The last is to see how changes of N affect Se(N, e). Notice that on EL, Se(N, e) is a
constant w.r.t. both N and e, thus S(N, e) is linear in e with a slope that is constant w.r.t.
changes of N .
However on EH , Se(N, e) is strictly decreasing in both e and N . To summarize, an
increase of N enlarges the constant region of Se(N, e), and shifts Se(N, e) up on its decreasing
region. Loosely speaking, it shifts Se(N, e) to the right.
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Once I take into consideration of the firm’s price Q, it shifts up the marginal benefit of
effort Q • Se(N, e) proportionally. Corollary 2 proved.
1.6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Using results from Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, the proof is straightforward. Let’s start
with the existence and uniqueness of e(N). As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, Se(N, e) >
0. Assumption 2 states that F ′(0) = 0 and the fixed cost component is very small, so the
optimal effort level e(N) must be an interior solution. In addition, since S(N, e) is concave
while F (e) is strictly convex, e(N) would be uniquely pinned down by the first order condition
Q • Se(N, e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal benefit
= F ′(e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
.
Figure 1.4: Marginal Benefit v.s. Marginal Cost























Depending on different values of N , there could be two scenarios. First is that N is small
49




) . For example, N1 or N2
in the graph above. If that is the case, an increase of N will raise e up. Because as shown
in Corollary 2, an increase of N shifts Q • Se(N, e) up when e is above the effort cutoff.
The second scenario is that N is large enough so F ′(e) intersects with Q • Se(N, e) below
the effort cutoff. In this case, when N increases, the intersection point will not be affected.
Because an increase of N has no effect on Q • Se(N, e) when e is below the effort cutoff.
Also notice that an increase of N raises the effort cutoff, so it is basically shifting Q •
Se(N.e) to the right. There must exist a N̄ such that once N > N̄ , the intersection is below
the cutoff.
At last, since an increase of Q shifts Q • Se(N, e) up proportionally everywhere, it raises
e as well as the N̄ .
1.6.4 Centralized Financial Market
In the centralized setup, I assume a collective contract between the unity of households and
the financial intermediary governing the borrowing size X and effort level e, and a Nash
bargaining to determine the return rate R.
Assumption 6. The unity of households and the financial intermediary write a collective
contract governing X and e. For any given Q, X, e and realization of χ, the promised return
rate R, as well as the commission fee M , are determined by a Nash bargaining over the net
surplus33
Q • S(N, e)− F (e)−X, (1.5’”)
subject to N = exp(χ)
n(X)
ξ
. The bargaining power of the financial intermediary is γ ∈ (0, 1).
The surplus term is essentially the profit function of the financial intermediary in the
decentralized financial market, since in the decentralized equilibrium the intratemporal re-
33At the optimal effort level it will always be non-negative.
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turn rate to households R must be equalized to 1. γ works as the parameter governing the
financial intermediary’s market power. The lower γ is, the less market power the financial
intermediary has. So the act of introducing competition to the market could be done by
reducing γ.
One may concern whether the split of the surplus is implementable through an incentive
compatible collective contract, since it is contingent on e but the effort level is hidden from
the households. To answer this question, I give the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Any Nash bargaining over the surplus can be implemented by an incentive
compatible collective contract between the unity of households and the financial intermediary.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix 1.6.5. The intuition is that as long as
the financial intermediary doesn’t deviate from the descending allocation rule, the number
of success S serves as a perfect signal of the effort level e. So a contract written on S is
equivalent to a contract written on e.
With Nash bargaining, the incentives for the unity of households and the financial inter-
mediary in choosing X and e, as well as the allocation rule, are perfectly aligned. That is,
to maximize the surplus specified in (1.5’”). The unity of the households and the financial
intermediary negotiate on the optimal investment size and the optimal screening effort level.
Again, denote the optimal investment size as X∗, and the optimal effort level as e∗. Given
all other things equal, the X∗ and e∗ here should be exactly the same as their counterparts
in the decentralized equilibrium.
Now the commission fee is
M∗ = γ
[
Q • S(N∗, e∗)−X∗
]
+ (1− γ)F (e∗), (1.11’)
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And the unity of households gets
Q • S(N∗, e∗)−M∗,
which shall be distributed evenly among all households.
Different from what’s in the decentralized setup though, once a collective contract is
finalized, an individual household is no longer allowed to freely choose how much resources
to supply to the financial intermediary. This is because Nash bargaining yields a positive
intratemporal net return for the unity of households.
Rcentralized − 1 =










Remember that the reason for introducing a centralized financial market is to be able to
vary the market power of the financial intermediary. To see how it is done, one can derive
the profit of the financial intermediary through Nash bargaining as
M∗ − F (e∗) = γ
[
Q • S(N∗, e∗)− F (e∗)−X∗
]
.
Which is exactly γ portion of its counterpart in the decentralized equilibrium.
As a matter of fact, I can achieve the same result in the competitive financial market by
posing a tax rate of 1− γ on the financial intermediary’s profit. The taxation income shall
be rewarded to the households as a lump-sum transfer
T = (1− γ)
[
Q • S(N∗, e∗)− F (e∗)−R • X∗
]
,
which doesn’t affect an individual household’s incentive on how much to lend on the com-
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petitive intratemporal borrowing and lending market. One can check that
Q • S(N∗, e∗) = M∗ +R • X∗ + T
shall always hold.
1.6.5 Proof of Theorem 4
The key is to show that there exists a collective contract to incentivize the financial inter-
mediaries to always follow the descending allocation rule. Because if they do, the resulted
success function S(N, e) serves as a perfect signal of e. Writing a contract in terms of S is
thus equivalent to one written on e.
Consider the following simple contract written by the households to elicit a certain effort
level ê. Given the aggregate size of entrepreneurs to be funded N , the households take the
ownership of the firms, but promise to pay a financial intermediary certain amount of final
goods M , which is larger or equal to the private cost F (ê) incurred, as long as the number
of firms created by this financial intermediary is no less than S(N, ê), otherwise paying 0.34
With a simple contract described above, a financial intermediary’s unique best response
is to exert effort level ê and follow the descending allocation rule. To see that, one should
remember ê is the minimum effort level required to create S(N, e) many new firms. If a
financial intermediary chooses an effort level low than ê, it will get paid 0 for sure. If the
financial intermediary chooses an effort level higher than ê, it may get paid the same M but
with a higher cost. And with the effort level being exactly ê, the financial intermediary can
create S(N, e) many firms only if it follows the optimal allocation rule, aka the descending
allocation rule.
Now to fully implement the commission fee determined by the Nash bargaining, the
34I assume limited liability on the financial intermediary side.
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households need to write a complex contract in which the payment M changes with e ac-
cording to Assumption 6. Since the commission fee is strictly increasing in both the number
of firms created S, and the inferred cost of effort F (e), the financial intermediary’s unique
best response is still to stick with the descending allocation rule.
To summarize, the key features for the contract to work are: 1. Given N and e, S(N, e)
is achievable only through the descending allocation rule; 2. S(N, e) is strictly increasing in
e, thus serves as a perfect signal of the effort level; 3. The commission fee determined by the
Nash bargaining is strictly increasing in S and F (e).
1.6.6 Characterizing the Equilibrium
At each period t, after the realization of the productivity shocks εt and χt, the economy is
characterized by four state variables: the aggregate capital stock Kt, the aggregate variety
stock At, the realized productivity shock in the intermediate goods sector εt, and the realized
productivity shock in the financial sector χt.
I claim that the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium of the economy is characterized
by the following equations.







































πt+1 + (1− η)Qt+1
)]
; (1.34)




























t −Rt • X∗t
]
+ (1− γ)F (e∗t ); (1.40)










































At+1 − (1− η)At = S∗t ; (1.48)
Equation (1.29) - (1.32) are from the final goods and intermediate goods firm’s static
profit maximization problem. Equation (1.33) - (1.35) are from the individual household’s
optimization problem. Equation (1.36) - (1.41) are from the financial intermediary’s static
profit maximization problem, with a taxation on profit. Equation (1.42) and (1.43) are the
aggregation conditions. Equation (1.44) governs the evolution of the productivity shocks.
Equation (1.45) - (1.48) are the market clearing conditions for final goods, capital, inratem-
poral borrowing and lending, and firm’s shares market respectively.
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The economy exhibits a saddle-path stable steady-state when the love of variety τ is
close to 0. Following the real business cycle literature, I solve a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium around the steady-state, using perturbation method. I’m not going to write
out the equations characterizing the steady-state, cause they are just repetitions of equation
(1.29) - (1.48), without the productivity shocks of course.
1.6.7 Criteria for Group Division
I did the following selection, what’s left are in the information-creating group, what’s taken
out is in the non-information-creating group.
First, I take out stocks whose offer price is below 5$. This is based on SEC’s definition
of a “penny stock”. These stocks are not traded frequently or widely after the IPO, so they
are still considered to be unknown or unavailable to the general public.
Second, I take out stocks that are not listed or traded on a “national securities exchange”.35
For the same reason that these stocks are not traded frequently or widely after IPO.
Third, I take out IPO that are issued by firms whose main business are: open/close-end
funds, special financial vehicles, blank check companies (SPACs), REITs. Because these
stocks are issued for special purposes.
1.6.8 Regression Results of Individual Stocks
I pool all individual stocks together, and run regression of their commission rates (cmrit) on
values (valit) and the unemployment rate (urt).
35SEC has a detailed list of national securities exchanges.
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Table 1.6: Regression of Individual Stocks: All Stocks






[p < 0.05(∗), p < 0.01(∗∗), p < 0.001(∗ ∗ ∗)]
I do the same for the information-creating group.
Table 1.7: Regression of Individual Stocks: Information-creating Group






[p < 0.05(∗), p < 0.01(∗∗), p < 0.001(∗ ∗ ∗)]
And for the non-information-creating group.
Table 1.8: Regression of Individual Stocks: Non-information-creating Group






[p < 0.05(∗), p < 0.01(∗∗), p < 0.001(∗ ∗ ∗)]
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1.6.9 Robustness Check
In this robustness check, I set the convexity parameter in the cost of effort to be κ = 3,
which is about 5 times to its benchmark value 0.59. The corresponding table of correlations
is as follows.
Table 1.9: Simulated Correlations under Large κ
Correlation with Y M∗/X∗ e∗/X∗ S∗/X∗ C
Simulation -0.18 -0.20 -0.26 0.74
Data -0.21 n/a n/a 0.76
The corresponding table of counterfactual results is as follows.
Table 1.10: Counterfactual Results under Large κ
Counterfactual Y Volatility C Volatility Household Welfare
Vary F (e)
20% 0.02% 0.11% -0.37%
-20% -0.03% -0.15% 0.48%
Commission Rate Cap 0.43% 2.03% -6.64%
Shut Down Intermediary 1.51% 4.01% -3.79%









Antitrust Policy in a Globalized
Economy
Linyi Cao1 Lijun Zhu2
2.1 Introduction
The measured markup, i.e. the difference between price and marginal cost, has been in-
creasing since the 1980s in the US (De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017), Barkai (2016)). An
increasing markup leads to efficiency loss as it lowers aggregate production and raises price
comparing to the social optimal level. Further, if the rise of markup among firms varies,
misallocation caused by markup differences among heterogeneous firms worsens. On the
other hand, as an important tool to restrain monopoly power, antitrust policy in the U.S.
has been relaxed, and number of Mergers and acquisitions has surged since the 1980s. This
paper provides a framework to evaluate cost and benefits of antitrust policy in a global con-
1Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO
63130 (email: l.cao@wustl.edu).
2Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking University (email: lijunzhu@nsd.pku.edu.cn).
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text. M&A reallocate resources from small to large and typically more productivity firms,
while also increase monopoly power of the latter. Optimal antitrust policy seeks a balance
between the positive productivity effect and the negative markup effect.
We first measure markup among US public firms using the method proposed in De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017), and empirically establish a
connection between M&A activity and markup at firm level. The average markup, weighted
by cost of goods sold, increases from about 4% in 1980 to 16% in 2017. Comparing to
1980, the distribution of markup among public firms in 2015 clearly shifts to the right. By
combining Compustat public firm data and SDC mergers and acquisition data, we find that
increase of a firm’s markup in the next year is about 2% higher, in relative terms, if this firm
has merged or acquired at least one other firm in the current year. This amplification effect
is stronger if the acquirer has a larger per-merger markup.
We then build a dynamic general equilibrium mode of M&A to analyze optimal antitrust
policy. Our model builds on David (2017), which developed a model of Mergers and acqui-
sitions in a firm dynamics framework. Firm heterogeneity is summarized by a productivity
parameter, which determines firm size. The M&A market is characterized as a two-sided
costly search and matching. To capture complementarity between acquirer and targets,
M&A is assumed to increase the acquirer’s post-merger productivity, while the magnitude
of increase depends on the pre-merger size of the target. Upon a successful M&A, the target
exits the economy.
The main difference of our model from David (2017) is that we incorporate heterogeneous
markup into the framework. Monopoly power is an important dimension of mergers and
acquisitions, and our model allows to study optimal antitrust policy. Firms with different
size charge different markups. In the model, large firms face a less elastic demand and charge
a higher markup. Mergers and acquisitions increase acquirers’ size as well as post-merger
markup. Heterogeneous markup across firms result in misallocation, and a larger dispersion
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due to increase in markup of large firms amplifies productivity loss due to misallocation.
Antitrust policy is modeled though a search cost function in the M&A market. That is,
a stricter antitrust policy imposes a higher merger cost. Optimal antitrust policy seeks to
balance the positive productivity and the negative markup effect. The productivity effect
reallocates resource to larger and more productive firms and increases aggregate production,
while the markup effect increases misallocation and lowers aggregate output. As both effects
are reflected in the aggregate output, we use aggregate production/consumption to measure
welfare. Initially strict, a more lenient antitrust policy might increase production as it
allows more productivity-enhancing reallocation. This increase is eventually reversed as the
M&A technology admits decreasing return to scale on the acquirer side. Therefore, after a
certain point, a further relaxation of antitrust policy starts to decrease total output as the
productivity effect becomes limited and the markup effect takes over.
We quantitatively show that total consumption (or/and output) is a hump-shaped func-
tion of the antitrust policy variable in the model. The optimal policy corresponds to the one
that maximizes total consumption. In a work in progress, we are extending the model to an
open economy, and aim to formalize the intuition that open to trade demands a more lenient
optimal antitrust policy and explore its quantitative implications for aggregate markup and
welfare.
The rest of the chapter is organized as the following: In section 2.2, we present empirical
facts regarding markup and Mergers & Acquisitions, and show that there is positive effect of
M&A on firms’ markup. The model, first in a closed economy and then extended to an open
economy framework, is shown in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 provides a quantitative analysis,
while a concluding remark is offered in Section 2.5.
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2.2 Facts
This section provides empirical facts regarding markup, firm size and M&As. We measure
markup using the method proposed in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker
and Eeckhout (2017)3. The measurement bases on the following observation: firm’s markup,
i.e. ratio of price to marginal cost, is equal to the ratio of the output elasticity with respect
to an input without significant adjustment cost, to the cost share of this input4. The latter
can be directly calculated from firms balance sheet, while the former is estimated by using a
control function approach from the production estimation literature (Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)).
2.2.1 The Rising Markups
We apply the method mentioned above and use Compustat data to estimate firm level
markups5. There are in total 321,315 firm × year valid observations from 1951 to 20176.
After obtaining firm level markup, we average them across firms by using input cost as the
weight. The resulted average markup is plotted in Figure 2.17. With up and downs, the
average markup in early 1980s is at about the same level as in 1950s. However, over the last
3-4 decades, the measured markup has greatly increased from about 4% in 1980 to about
16% in 2017.
3See appendix a brief introduction of the method
4This equivalence can be seen clearly from firm’s cost minimization problem, as shown in appendix.
5Following De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017), we choose “cost of goods sold” in compustat as the choice
input, and estimate output elasticity to this input for each 2 digit NAICS sector. In the baseline estimation,
we assume this elasticity does not change over time.
6This number only includes firm × year observations for which data is available for the estimation of
markup, and thus excludes observations with missing data. See Table 2.7 in appendix for NO in each year.
7Figure 2.5 in appendix shows both cost-weighted average markup and sales-weighted average markup.
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1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Note: Average markups among public firms, with weights equal to cost of goods sold. The value for year t
is a moving average of original values from year t− 2 to year t+ 2.Data source: Compustat.
Figure 2.2 presents the distribution of markup (i.e. estimated pricemarginal cost) among Com-
pustat public firms in 1980 and 20158. The distribution in these two years show a clear
difference9. The distribution in 2015 has more firms with markups on the right tail, while
the 1980 distribution is characterized by a concentration of markups at the left tail. The
median markup in 1980 is 1.10, 75% is 1.33 and 90% 1.76. These three numbers in 2015
are 1.20, 1.66, and 2.71 respectively. A rising average markup is mainly driven by a rise of
markup on the right tail.
8We rank estimated markups among all public firms across all years in Compustat. To rule out ex-
treme values, Figure 2.2 presents this distribution conditional on markup values locates between 5 and 95
percentiles. Distribution of markup values between 1 and 99 percentiles is shown in Figure 2.8 in Appendix.
9There are % of firms that have an estimated markup below 1, See De Loecker and for an explanation.
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markup
1980 2015
Note: Distribution of markups conditional on markup values between 5 and 95 percentiles of the whole
distribution. Data source: Compustat.
Within a sector, large firms tend to have higher markups. Table 2.1 presents the correla-
tion between firm size and measured markup. We simply run a regression of markup (in log)
to a measurement of firm size. In particular, firm size can be measured using sale, capital,
or employment. After controlling for year and sector fixed effect, the correlation between
firms size and markup is positive and significant.











R2 0.06 0.03 0.03
NO 321,339 321,339 286,658
Note: Data source: Compustat, 1980-2017
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The fact that average markup has been rising is also related to increasing concentration
in many industries in the U.S. since the 1980s, as documented in Autor, Dorn, Kats, Patter-
son, and Van Reenen (2017) and Boldrin and Zhu (2018). Figure 2.6 in appendix presents
concentration index in the Manufacturing sector, which was relatively stable from the 1960s
to the early 1980s, but has been increasing over the past three to four decades. The index
for the aggregate economy, averaged over 2-digit NAICS sectors and shown in Table 2.2, has
risen steadily from 1987 to 2012.
Table 2.2: Economy-wide Concentration, Sales Share of Top-50 Firms
Year 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Share50 26.00% 26.57 26.69 29.52 30.51 31.31
Data source: Boldrin and Zhu (2018)
2.2.2 The Rising M&A Activities
On the other hand, since the Reagan administration took office in the early 1980s, antitrust
policy implementation has been relaxed drastically (Mueller, 1984). A more lenient antitrust
policy is reflected in a rising Mergers and acquisitions cases after the 1980s. Figure 2.3
presents the ratio of total M&As to total NO of firms in the U.S. from 1977 to 201510. This
ratio was 0.065% in 1977, relatively stable in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and has risen
to 0.245% in 2014. M&A activity in Figure 2.3 demonstrates a clear up-and-down wave
patterns. In current paper, we focus on the long run trend from the 1980s on wards, and
do not address this wave pattern. Figure 2.7 in appendix shows total number of M&A from
1850 to present. The post-1980s period stands out in even longer historical horizons.
10Total value of M&As increases from 306 trillion U.S. dollars in 1985 to 1741 in 2017, an increase of 469%.
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year
Ratio of MAs to NO. of Firms, %
Data source: https://imaa-institute.org.
Market power is an important consideration in antitrust policy implementation. Empiri-
cally, firm’s M&A activity is expected to be closely related to its markup. To test the effect
of M&A on markup, we first merge Compustat firm data with SDC-M&A data, which starts
in 1980. From 1980 to 2015, there are 246, 452 firm × year observations in Compustat11.
Among which 40, 291, or 16%, have at least one M&A.




) = β0 + β1MAi,t + β2 ln(markupi,t) + controls+ ε,
where MAi,t is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if firm i has at least one mergers &
acquisitions in year t. The dependent variable is the relative change in markup for firm i
from year t to year t + 1. Firm’s current markup is added as a control as relative change
is expected to be small given a firm already have a large value of markup today. Year and
sector dummies are also added as controls in the regression. Table 2.3 presents the regression
11This number is counted after dropping observations with missing values.
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results
Table 2.3: Effect of M&A on Markup








Year D Yes Yes
Sector D Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.12
NO 221,213 221,213
Date source: Compustat and SDC-MA
Column 1 shows the baseline results. The coefficient in front of IMA is positive and
significant. The effect is economically sound, firm’s markup increases 1.9% in average after
an M&A activity. Column 2 adds the interaction term between markup and the M&A
dummy, to capture the conjecture that the amplification effect of M&A on markup might
be larger for firms which have already had a larger markup. Year and sector dummies are
also added. As in column 1, the coefficient in front of the interaction term is positive and
significant.
2.3 Model
We are now ready to provide a modeling framework to evaluate costs and benefits of antitrust
policy. The model here builds on David (2017), which is a firm dynamics model with Mergers
and acquisitions. Firms are heterogeneously endowed with a productivity, which can be
changed through M&A and is otherwise constant. Upon paying a cost, firms search for
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potential targets/acquirers and successfully matched pairs decide whether to consummate
a M&A deal. Due to technical complementarity between acquirers and targets, acquirers
increase their productivity by merging other firms, with the magnitude of increase depends
on the pre-merger size of targets. We introduce heterogeneous markup and international
trade into that framework. In particular, heterogeneous markup is modeled as a result of
different elasticity of demand faced by different firms. We start with a closed economy version
of the model and then extend it to an open economy.
2.3.1 Benchmark Economy
The economy consists of two sectors, an intermediate goods sector where each single firm
monopolies in producing an intermediate variety, and a final good sector where firms produce
competitively by aggregating over intermediate goods. We start with the competitive final
good sector.
Final Good The final good is produced competitively by aggregating over intermediate








where Yt denotes quantity of the final good in period t and yt(ω) intermediate variety ω.
Following Kimball (1995), σ(x) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function, satisfying
σ(1) = 1. The case where σ(x) = x
ε−1
ε gives the typical CES aggregator.
Normalize the price of final good as 1 and denote pt(ω) the price of intermediate goods







subject to the production function above. The maximization problem gives the demand





















One property of the derived demand function facing intermediate varieties is that, depending
on the specific functional form of σ(x), the elasticity of demand might vary across interme-
diate goods producing firms. This generates heterogeneous markups among intermediate
firms.
Intermediate Goods Each intermediate good is produced by a single firm. An inter-




t , δ ∈ (0, 1].
Intermediate firms optimally choose quantity and price of its products and the amount of




where Wt is common wage rate in period t. Intermediate firms are subject to the demand
scheme from the final goods sector.
As in Klenow and Willis (2016) and Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2018), we choose the
71
following specification of the kimball aggregator



























where α ≥ 0 and β > 1, and Γ(a, b) ≡
∫∞
b
xα−1e−xdx is the upper incomplete Gamma
function. Under this aggregation, the term σ′(q), with q ≡ y
Y
representing the relative size










which is a decreasing function of relative size. That is, large firm (i.e. with larger q)
faces a smaller demand elasticity and optimally charge a higher markup. To see this, use
this demand function to substitute away price in intermediate firms’ profit maximization
problem and rewrite it as










































From this first order condition, we can easily verify that q∗(z) is strictly increasing in z.
Firms with a higher productivity have a larger market shares. The markup, i.e. the ratio of








That is, markup is an increasing function of q. larger firms charge a higher markup. The





which is strictly increasing in q∗ in the interval of [0, (α+ β)β/α]. Since q∗(z) ≤ ββ/α,∀z, the
profit π(z) is also strictly increasing in z, although we no longer have a simple closed form
of it as in the CES case (α = 0).
Mergers and Acquisitions To single out the effect of M&A, we assume that inter-
mediate firms’ productivity and size can change after M&A, and stay constant otherwise.
Following David (2017), M&A is modeled under a search and matching framework. Each
firm simultaneously decide to search to be an acquirer or/and a target in the M&A mar-
ket. Upon successfully match with a target which has a productivity zt, the post-merger
productivity of an acquirer firm with pre-merger productivity za is
zm = m(za, zt).
It is assumed that m is an increasing function in both of its arguments. The function
captures the productivity increase due to technological complementarity between acquirers
and targets. Denote V (z) the value of firm with productivity z, which will be specified below.
M&A possibly increases acquirer’s size and value, and the potential gain from M&A is
G(za, zt) = V (zm)− V (za)− V (zt),
and a M&A will be proposed if and only if G(za, zt) > 0.
A M&A proposal has a probability τ(za, zt) ∈ [0, 1] of being passed by the policy maker.
τ is allowed to be dependent on (za, zt). If a M&A is proposed and passed, the surplus is split
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between the acquirer and the target through Nash Bargaining, denote γ as the bargaining
power of the acquirer. Define Ga and Gt as the expected net gains for the acquirer and
target, from a successful matching, respectively. It follows that
Ga(za, zt) = max
{
τ(za, zt)γG(za, zt), 0
}
;
Gt(za, zt) = max
{
τ(za, zt)(1− γ)G(za, zt), 0
}
.
In a consummated M&A, the acquirer pays the target
P (za, zt) = V (zt) + (1− γ)G(za, zt),
and continues with the post-merger productivity zm, while the target exits the economy. If
the M&A does not happen, both firms continues with their original productivity. We omit
the possible financial constraints, and assume that an acquirer can always afford to pay
P (za, zt), either by a lump-sum transfer or a long-term contract.
As in David (2017), firms simultaneously choose search intensities λ(z) of meeting a
potential target and µ(z) of meeting a potential acquirer, with the associated costs given by
c(x;φ), for x = λ, µ.
c(x;φ) is increasing in x, implying a higher cost for a higher search intensity, and also
increases with φ, which represents the strength of antitrust policy. A higher value of φ
implies a larger M&A cost, and therefore represents a stricter antitrust policy. A relaxation
of antitrust policy is modeled as a decrease in the value of φ.
Market tightness on the acquirer (target) side is defined as the total search intensity from
potential targets (acquirers) to that from potential acquirers (targets). A higher tightness
implies a higher matching rate. Denote F (z) the distribution of active firms, which will be
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The rate a type za acquirer meets a type zt target, and vice versa, is given by
λ(za)θa
µ(zt)dF (zt)∫




λ(z)dF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ(za)
.
where λ(za)θa denotes the rate the acquirer za meets a target, and Ω(zt) denotes the
conditional probability that this target has productivity zt. A symmetric interpretation
applies on the target side.
Value Functions Assume that firms exit at an exogenous rate η. The value of a firm
as a function of the state variable, productivity z, is
(ρ+ η)V (z) = max
λ,µ
π(z)− c(λ;φ)− c(µ;φ) + λθaEzt [Ga(z, zt)] + µθtEza [Gt(za, z)].
Firms optimally choose search intensities, both as an acquirer and a target13. The flow
value of a firm with productivity z is equal to, the instantaneous profit π, plus the expected
net benefit from searching in the M&A market.
Entry, Exit and Equilibrium As mentioned earlier, firms exit with an exogenous rate
η. A firm enters the economy by paying a fixed cost ce, then draws its initial productivity z
from an exogenous distribution H(z). Free entry implies the expected value of entry equals
this fixed entry cost, i.e. ∫
V (z)dH(z) = ce.
12Note that as the model is in continuous time, these two tightness index do not have to be smaller than
1.
13In an infinitely small interval of time, the probability of simultaneously meeting a potential target and
a potential acquirer is zero.
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Denote Me total mass of entrants, and M mass of all active firms. The distribution of firm































I(G(za, z) > 0)Φ(za)︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow through being merged
− ηdF (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow through exog. exit
.
This law of motion decompose changes in probability over any state z into 5 possible
channels: Firms with a different productivity might merger other firms and obtain a post-
merger productivity z; Exogenous entrants might draw a productivity z; Firms originally
with productivity z might merger other firms and arrive at a new (higher) productivity;
Firms originally with productivity z might be merged by other firms and exit the economy;
Firms originally with productivity z might exit upon being hit by the exogenous exit shock.
In a stationary equilibrium, the mass at each state is constant. That is, change is equal to
zero,
dḞ (z) = 0, ∀ z.
The economy admits a representative household, who owns all firms, and wage and firm
profits. It also pays the entry cost ce. The household consumes all it income every period as
saving is not allowed. It is endowed with 1 unit of labor, and supplies it inelastically.
We close the model with market clearing conditions. Labor is used in producing inter-








dF (z) = 1.
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The final good can be used in three ways: consumption, payment of search cost in the M&A
market, and payment of entry cost. Market clearing implies
Y = C + Ys +MeCe,
where total search cost equals that for acquirers and targets. That is
Ys = M
∫
c (λ(z);φ) dF (z) +M
∫
c (µ(z);φ) dF (z).
Now we can formally define the equilibrium in our model.
Definition 2. We focus on a Stationary Equilibrium of the economy, which in the closed










Firm’s search intensity policy functions and value function from the dynamic search and
matching problem,
{
λ(z), µ(z), V (z)
}
, such that
1. Policy functions solve their corresponding maximization problems;
2. The free entry condition is met;
3. The goods and labor markets clear;
4. The evolution of firm characteristic distribution is consistent with the stationary con-
ditions.
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2.3.2 Trade and New Entrants’ Quality
We extend the model into an open economy framework in the following way. Now with










where yFt (ω) > 0 implies net import, and yFt < 0 implies net export. yt(ω) is total amount of
intermediate variety ω. In equilibrium, it always holds that y∗t (ω) + yFt (ω) > 0. To simplify
analysis, pFt (ω) are set to the same as pt(ω).
































where qF (z) is exogenously given.14






, we could reach




σ′(q∗ + qF )
σ′(q∗ + qF ) + σ′′(q∗ + qF )q∗
.
The M&A, entry, exit, stationary distribution, and the labor market clearing condition do
not change. The only change comes from the final good market clearing condition, which
14Note that when qF < 0, the concavity of the maximization problem above could be violated locally
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now is
Y = C + Ys +MeCe + Y
F ,
where C, Ys and Me are defined as in the closed economy, and
Y F = M
∫
pF (z)yF (z)dF (z)
is payment to (from) foreign market, with
pF (z) = p(z) = σ′
(




This section provides the quantitative results. We first specify a few function forms. The






where A > 0, κ > ε > 0. The latter implies that post-merger productivity relies more
heavily on the productivity of acquirers, and it is therefore more likely that large firms





where φ > 0, ν > 1. As detailed in the model part, the Kimball aggregator is set to be
the Klenow-Willis form.
Parameters There are 12 parameters in the model. For M&A technology related pa-
rameters, A, κ and ε, we borrow the estimated values from David (2017), and for parameters
in the kimball aggregator from Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2018). We pick the discount rate
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to be 0.05 to match an annual interest rate of 5%, and η to be 0.04 to target an annual exit
rate of 4%. δ, which governs the decreasing return to scale in intermediate goods production,
is chosen to be 0.8 to match a 20% of profit rate. The entry cost ce is normalized to 1.15
Table 2.4 summarizes the current parameterization
Table 2.4: Parameterization
Para. meaning values source
ρ discount rate 0.05 interest rate
δ para. in intermediate prod. func. 0.8 20% profit rate
η exit rate 0.04
γ bargaining power 0.49
ξ para. in new entrant’s prod. distr. 10
A scale para. in M&A tech. 1.05 David’17
κ acquirer productivity elasticity 0.91 David’17
ε target productivity elasticity 0.53 David’17
ν para. in search cost func. 8
ce entry cost 1 normalization
α para. in kimball aggr. 2.18 EMX’18
β para. in kimball aggr. 11.55 EMX’18
We pick φ and τ as “technology parameter” and “policy parameter”, and try to pin down
their optimal values. We then experiment on different ce and qF , try to figure out their
effects on the optimal parameter values. We hope this exercise would shed light on why the
antitrust policy has been weakened since the 1980s.
Under the benchmark parameterization and set τ = 1, household welfare shows a clear
hump-shaped curve as we vary φ.
15We are currently working on a more deliberate calibration.
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Table 2.5: Welfare under Different φ
φ 10 20 40 60 80 100
C 1.7334 1.7777 2.1741 2.2072 2.1202 2.0849
Y 1.9171 1.9478 2.2603 2.2811 2.2119 2.1830
This implies an optimal technology parameter value at φ∗ = 60.16 Figure 2.4 plots
consumption and output under different values of φ.
Figure 2.4: Consumption and Output under Different φ














Open Economy The next part presents results we have experimented with several
versions of the qF (z) function. If qF (z) > 0 (< 0), the economy is net importing (exporting)
in all varieties with characteristic z. We keep ce = 1 in those exercises.
16Unfortunately, we don’t observe such pattern when we keep φ constant and vary τ . So we pick φ as our
’parameter of interest’ and do comparative statics.
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Case 1: qF (z) = xindex − 1
x 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.08 1.10 1.15 1.20
φ∗ 60 60 60 60 60 60 40
Y F/Y 0% 7.34 17.70 26.76 32.63 48.42 69.43
Case 2: qF (z) = xz − 1
x 1.00 1.10 1.15 1.20
φ∗ 60 40 40 40
Y F/Y 0% 19.05 26.35 31.47
Case 3: qF (z) = zx − yz
x, y 1.00 , 1.00 1.30 , 0.70 1.50 , 0.90 2.00 , 0.95
φ∗ 60 40 60 40
Y F/Y 0% 42.60 32.80 52.87
We have then done an exercise where international trade has been shut down, but the
quality of entrants is allowed to vary. We change zpeak of H(z), while keep it as a Pareto
distribution on [zpeak,∞]. The following table presents the results.
Table 2.6: Entry Quality and Optimal φ
zpeak 1.00 1.10 1.21 1.32 1.45
φ∗ 60 60 80 120 140
As the new entrant firm’s productivity distribution shifts to the right, the optimal φ∗
increases. If the productivity of young firms relative to old incumbent firms decline over
time, the implied optimal antitrust policy should be more lenient.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to evaluate the costs and benefits of antitrust policy in
a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We first provide empirical evidence for evolv-
ing distribution of markup across public firms and the effect of mergers and acquisitions
on acquiring firms’ markup. We then present a dynamic general equilibrium model that
incorporates both the productivity enhancing and markup increasing effect of mergers and
acquisitions. Optimal antitrust policy seeks a balance between these two forces. We showed
that in a closed economy version of our model, Welfare, measured as aggregate consumption
in a stationary equilibrium, is a hump-shaped function of antitrust policy.
We extend the benchmark model to an open economy and aim to formalize the following
intuition: in a globalized economy, increasing productivity fully accrues to domestic firms
while a higher markup only partially hurts domestic consumers. A weakening antitrust
policy since the 1980s is thus an optimal response to the increasing globalization in the same
period.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Measurement of Markups
We use the price-marginal cost markup, Pi
MCi
, to indicate the monopoly power of firm i, and
measure it by using methods proposed in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker
and Eeckhout (2017). The method starts with the typical cost minimization problem of firm
i is17
L(Vi, Ki, λi) = P Vi Vi + riKi − λi
(
F (Vi, Ki)− Ȳ
)
,
17Note the implicit assumption here is that
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where P Vi and Vi are the price and quantity of the variable input, ri and Ki are the user cost
and quantity of capital. F (.) is the production function and Ȳ is the targeted output level,
and λi is the Lagrangian multiplier. The advantage of writing in this way is that λ = ∂L∂Ȳ ,
i.e. λi gives the marginal cost of firm i. The first order condition w.r.t. Vi reads























where PiYi and P Vi Vi are observed in data, and εVi ≡ ∂Yi∂Vi
Vi
Yi
is the elasticity of output w.r.t.
the variable input and can be estimated from data.
Assume the production function is, Q = F (V,K) exp(z)18. Take log on both sides and
use lower case letters to denote natural logarithmic of variables,
q = ξvv + ξkk + z + ε.
Demand of the variable input, V , is a function of capital stock, K, and unobserved produc-
tivity, Z, V=g(K, Z). We can then represent productivity, Z(z), as a function of K(k) and
V (v), i.e., z = h(k, v). In the first stage, run the following regression non-parametrically (or
18We assume the same production function at 2-digit NAICS sector level among Compustat firms.
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approximate φ by a polynomial)
q = φ(v, k) + ε.
Further assume the exogenous productivity follows a AR(1) process
zt+1 = ρzt + εz.
Obtain ẑ = φ̂(v, k) − ξvv − ξkk from the first stage, and we then apply general method of
moments to estimate ξv, by using the following moment conditions:
E [(ẑt − ρẑt−1)Xt−1] = 0.
In the baseline case, we include capital stock in period t, kt, and variable input in period
t− 1, vt−1, in Xt−1.
2.6.2 Solution Algorithm
• Guess





































19As we see in the model part, equilibrium q∗ will surely such that q∗ + qF ≥ 0.
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– Loop3: Guess V (z), construct G (za, zt) matrix based on V (z).
– Loop4: Guess µ (z) and θa, solve for λ (z) and θt from (2).
• Update
– Loop4: Use λ (z) and θt to solve for new µ (z) and θa from (2), update till converge.
– Loop3: Use µ (z), λ (z), θa, θt to get a new V (z) from (1), update till converge
and choose step small.
– Loop2: Use G (za, zt), µ (z), λ (z), θa, θt and M to solve for Me from:




τ (za, zt) I (G (za, zt)) Φ (za)
]
dF (zt)
With the exogenous dH (z), we can use the KFE to get a new
dF+1 (z) = dF (z) + step · (RHS of KFE)
update till converge.
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– Loop1: Check the free entry condition, if value>cost, increase w, otherwise reduce
it, till free entry condition is met or the change is too small.
2.6.3 Tables and Figures
Table 2.7: Number of Firms in Compustat Sample
Year NO Year NO Year NO Year NO
1951 441 1968 3015 1985 5929 2002 7299
1952 456 1969 3623 1986 6242 2003 7048
1953 474 1970 3717 1987 6430 2004 6873
1954 486 1971 3768 1988 6369 2005 6680
1955 516 1972 3885 1989 6231 2006 6553
1956 553 1973 3956 1990 6203 2007 6309
1957 573 1974 4354 1991 6293 2008 6027
1958 608 1975 5785 1992 6502 2009 5972
1959 637 1976 5804 1993 6867 2010 5757
1960 663 1977 5776 1994 7269 2011 5607
1961 1281 1978 5672 1995 7632 2012 5543
1962 1667 1979 5495 1996 8487 2013 5758
1963 1934 1980 5381 1997 8534 2014 5712
1964 2183 1981 5432 1998 8207 2015 5458
1965 2435 1982 5421 1999 8453 2016 5217
1966 2620 1983 5810 2000 8234 2017 4915
1967 2819 1984 5950 2001 7797
Data source: Compustat
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Table 2.8: Concentration in 2-digit Sectors
Share50, 2-digit Share04, 6-digit average
1997 2002 2007 2012 1997 2002 2007 2012
Wholesale Trade 20.3% 27.2 24.9 27.6 24.3% 31.4 29.1 30.8
Retail Trade 25.7 31.7 33.3 36.9 18.5 26.8 31.0 34.6
Transportation 30.7 33.0 42.7 42.1 23.6 24.5 30.8 35.2
Utilities 64.5 69 70.1 69.1 25.8 23.2 23.0 24.2
Information 62 62 62.3 49.8 52.4 52.0
Finance 38.6 44.9 46 48.5 26.0 32.0 36.1 35.4
Real Estate 19.5 24.4 26.1 24.9 18.8 24.0 25.1 23.3
Prof. Sci. Tech. 16.2 16.5 18.6 19.0 15.0 15.1 17.9 18.3
Administrative 22.1 21.9 23.0 23.7 21.8 23.1 24.4 24.4
Education 19.6 23.2 23.5 23.8 16.6 19.4 19.4 19.4
Health Care 18.8 17.2 17.4 19.6 16.2 15.1 15.1 17.0
Entertainment 21.8 23.5 24.1 24.3 19.2 20.5 21.5 21.6
Accommodation 21.1 23.1 23.7 21.2 13.8 17.4 18.5 16.0
Other Services 12.8 14 13.8 12.6 13.8 14.7 15.0 14.1
Note: For most services sectors in 1997, statistics are only available for establish-
ments subject to federal income taxes (instead of all establishments) in Service
sectors. To be consistent, the same criteria is applied to 2002, 2007, and 2012.
Table 2.9: Total Number of Firms in the Economy (Unit: thousand)
Year 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Economy 3147.9 3604.0 4179.8 4377.1 4752.3 4908.7 5240.0 4979.5
MFG 261.2 272.9 290.8 296.0 303.2 283.4 267.8 234.4
WHO 277.9 307.6 337.0 354.8 372.9 349.6 341.4 310.8
RET 942.8 912.7 953.0 939.8 955.6 949.5 980.0 953.0
TCP 121.3 130.5 153.9 162.2 187.9 190.1 195.6 185.4
FIRE 298.0 299.5 347.2 358.1 393.7 429.8 489.7 435.9
SRV 1122.5 1288.5 1600.8 1741.6 1924.9 2055.0 2344.1 2355.5
Note: MFG-Manufacturing; WHO-Wholesale trade; RET-Retail trade;
TCP-Transportation, communication and public utilities; SRV-Services.
Data source: Business Dynamics Statistics
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Figure 2.5: Average Markups, 1950-2017



















Note: Average markups among public firms, with weights equal to cost of goods sold for the blue line and
sales for the red line. Data source: Compustat.
Figure 2.6: Concentration in Manufacturing, 1963-2012













Note: The blue (resp. red) line plots the average revenue share of the 4 (resp. 8) largest firms across 6-digit
manufacturing sectors; the yellow line is the average revenue share of the 8 largest firms across 5-digit
manufacturing sectors. All values are weighted by revenue.
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Figure 2.7: Number of Mergers & Acquisitions in the U.S., 1850-2010
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Note: Distribution of markups conditional on markup values between 1 and 99 percentiles of the whole
distribution.Data source: Compustat.
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Anecdotal Evidence from Court Reports Reports from Mergers & Acquisitions
law cases suggest that international competition is an important consideration in antitrust
policy implementation. One such case is the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in the
1990s20. At that time, Boeing was the largest producer and accounts for about 64% of sales
in the world commercial jet aircraft market. The other two producers were Airbus Industries,
a European manufacturer which accounts for about 30%, and MaDonnell Douglas from the
U.S., with about 5%. Boeing submitted petition to both U.S. and the European Commission.
It was approved by the Americans and nearly prohibited by the European Union, which
eventually clear the merger after imposing strong conditions.
Both the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the European Commission investi-
gated the case, but they reached very different conclusion. The FTC has concluded that the
acquisition of McDonnell Douglass by Boeing would not create a monopoly or substantially
lessen competition in the commercial aircraft market. However, the European Commission
concluded that the merger would increase Boeing’s dominance. In its study, it was found that
the McDonnell Douglass’ presence led to a reduction of over 7% in the realized price. After
the FTC investigation, the Clinton Administration argued to key European official that the
merger is not anti-competitive and important to the employment in the United States, and
even threatened to retaliate if Europe undermines the merger. The European Commission
eventually backed away from a prohibition of the merger, but imposed significant conditions,
such as Boeing not to enforce its exclusivity rights under the agreements with big American
airline companies.




A Model of Technology Diffusion
Linyi Cao1 Cheng Wang2
3.1 Model
Let time be discrete and denoted t = 0, 1, ... and there is one good in the model economy.
An industry consists of a continuum of producers, normalized to be of measure one. These
producers have been in the industry for a long time, and up to time t = 0 all of them
have used an incumbent technology to produce θ0 (> 0) units of the good each period, with
certainty. But at t = 0 a new technology has come to existence, ready to be adopted by all
producers in the industry. This new technology is supposed to be more efficient relative to
the old but, being new, also brings with it uncertainty about how reliable it is.
The new technology may be reliable as desired, in which case it produces a high output
of θH (> θ0) units of the good with certainty. It could also be unreliable, in which case it
produces either the output θH or an output θL (< 0).
1Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO
63130 (email: l.cao@wustl.edu).
2School of Economics, Fudan University (email: wangcheng@fudan.edu.cn).
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The agents do not know, at t = 0 when the economy starts, whether the new technology
is reliable or not. But if the technology is not reliable, it could be detected. Specifically,
let ν ∈ [0, 1] be the measure (fraction) of the agents who are using the new technology in a
given period – the adoption rate in that period. If the technology is not reliable, then with
probability 1−P (ν) the true state of the technology would be detected in the period. Assume
1 − P (ν) is strictly increasing in ν. That is, the more producers are using the technology,
the more likely an unreliable technology is detected in a given period.
The values of θ0, θL, θH and the function P (ν) are all known to the producers, while the
value of ν evolves endogenously. Assume the value of P (ν) is close to one for all values of ν
– the technology, before being brought into the market, must have been tested many times,
in the lab and by real users, each time producing the desired output θH . But θL is so bad
that once the technology is found out to be not reliable – i.e., in case θL does occur – then
it should be abandoned.
What happens at t = 0 and the periods after is for each individual producer to decide
whether to adopt the new technology, and at what time. Those who have switched to the
new technology could also make a decision to switch back. Switching to the new technology
imposes a one time cost z on the producer, and the cost may differ between individual
producers. Let the producers be distributed in z with a distribution density g(z), where
z ∈ [0, z̄], with z̄ > 0, and g(z) ≥ 0 for all z. This distribution can be degenerate in which
case the switching costs are a constant for all producers. Lastly, switching back from the
new to the old technology imposes a common one time cost z∗ on any producer.
At the beginning of t = 0 when the story starts, producers hold individual beliefs about
whether or not the new technology is reliable. Let π (∈ [0, 1]) denote an individual producer’s
belief in a given period of the probability with which the new technology is reliable. At t = 0
the producers are distributed over the interval [0, 1], in their initial value of π. Let the
density of the initial beliefs be denoted f 0(π), π ∈ [0, 1].
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and, to abuse notation a little bit, we let the distribution of the initial ρ be denoted also as
f 0(ρ), ρ ∈ R. In the following, we use the word “belief” to refer to the producer’s π or ρ.
As time unfolds and the new technology gets used by more producers, new information
comes in, producers update their beliefs about the new technology, using a Bayesian updating
rule. That is, suppose an individual producer starts with an initial belief ρ, and suppose the
high output θH is produced by all users of the new technology in the current period, with ν
being the current adoption rate. Then the producer’s updated belief, ρ′, is given by
ρ′ = ρ− logP (ν). (3.2)
But if a low output θL is produced in any period, then all producers’ new belief ρ′ drops to
−∞ immediately. This implies that an unreliable new technology will be detected almost
for sure in the long run. And once detected, the economy will convert permanently back to
the old technology.
At the beginning of a period t, the economy is characterized by two aggregate states.
The first is a measure of producers who are still with the old technology, f tO(ρ), ∀ρ ∈ R.
Specifically, f tO(ρ) is the measure of producers who are still with the old technology and hold
the belief ρ at the beginning of period t. The second is a measure of producers who adopted
the new technology in a prior period: f tN(ρ), ∀ρ ∈ R. Of course, f 0O = f 0 and f 0N(ρ) = 0,
∀ρ ∈ R.
It takes time to switch to the new technology from the old. In order to use the new
technology in period t, the producer must make a decision to switch away from the old
95






(Note that this setup, though less intuitive, helps to simplify the value function.)
A producer who is still with the old technology then decides whether to switch to the
new technology for the next period. A producer are using the new technology could also
decide to switch back to the old. But in equilibrium, until the industry observes the first θL,
all producers who had switched to the new technology will stay with the new technology.
Suppose a low output θL is observed in a period T . Then all producers using the new
technology will cease production in T + 1, and switch back to the old technology. This
implies a value of V∗ from period T + 2 on, for all producers.








so that an unreliable technology, once detected, should be abandoned.
3.2 Equilibrium
At the start of a period, given that the new technology has not yet been detected as unreliable,
individual producers are divided into two groups: those who are with the old technology,
in state O, and those who are already with the new technology, in state N . Let ν ∈ [0, 1]
denote the fraction of the producers that are already with the new technology, that is in
state N . That is, ν is the “adoption rate” and we assume that its value is commonly
observed by all producers. At the start of the period producers hold beliefs about whether
the new technology is reliable or not. Let ρ denote an individual producer’s belief that the
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new technology is reliable. This ρ may differ across individual producers. In a rational
expectations equilibrium which we are about to define, agents are assumed to perfectly
perceive the initial distribution of ρ across agents and how that distribution evolve over
time. Specifically, let the rationally perceived measure of the beliefs of the state O producers
be denoted fO, and the measure of the beliefs of the producers in state N be denoted fN .
Let the value of an individual producer in state i(= O or N) and with belief ρ at the start
of a period be denoted Vi(ρ; fO, fN). This agent must make a decision in the current period
about whether to switch from his current technology state to the other technology and we
let his choice be denoted xi(ρ; fO, fN), where xi = 1 indicates the decision of choosing the
new technology and xi = 0 indicates the old. In a rational expectations equilibrium which
we are describing, each agent takes as given his rationally perceived equilibrium distribution
of the actions taken by all other producers in the current period, denoted x∗i (ρ; fO, fN).
Let us now describe the problem of an agent in state O, in the following Bellman equation:
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′; f ′O, f
′

















ρ′ = ρ− logP (ν), (3.7)













x̃i(ρ̂; fO, fN)fi(ρ̂). (3.9)
where ρ̂′ ≡ ρ̂− logP (ν).
For a producer in state N , he takes as given x̃i(ρ; fO, fN), i = O,N and solves:
VN(ρ; fO, fN) = max
xN∈{0,1}
(
π + (1− π)P (ν)
)
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To make a distinction, we call i the individual agent’s “technology state”, and ρ, fO, fN
the “belief states”.
Notice that (3.7)-(3.9) describe the evolution of the belief states given that θL doesn’t





If θL is ever observed, all producers’ belief about the reliability of the new technology will
converge to π = 0 or ρ → −∞ and stay permanently there in an absorbing state. Given
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VN = −z∗ + βV∗. (3.11)
Definition 3. A rational expectations equilibrium of the model consists of a set of value and
decision functions for the individual agents,
{
Vi(ρ; fO, fN), x
∗
i (ρ; fO, fN) : i = O,N
}
,
and a law of motion for the economy’s aggregate states {fO, fN}, given in equations (3.8)-
(3.9), such that
(I) Given the evolution of the belief states,
{
Vi(ρ; fO, fN), x
∗
i (ρ; fO, fN)
}
solves agent i’s
Bellman equation, i = O, N .
(II) The evolution of the aggregate states ν, fO and fN , is consistent with the initial ν,
fO and fN , the individual producer’s optimal decisions and the Bayesian rule that the agents
use for updating beliefs.
Following from (II) of the definition, if a low output (black swan event) is ever observed,
all belief states degenerate to π = 0 (ρ→ −∞). Otherwise, ρ evolves according to (3.7), fi
evolves according to (3.8) and (3.9).
3.3 Characterizing the Equilibrium
Assume lim
ν→0+
P (ν) < 1. That is, an unreliable new technology has a baseline probability of
being detected, even if there are a very small measure of producers who have adopted it.
99
Proposition 5. Suppose that the new technology is reliable. Suppose the initial distribution
of beliefs doesn’t have a mass point at π = 0. Then the equilibrium adoption rate will converge
to 1 as time goes to infinity.
But characterizing the dynamics on the equilibrium path is more challenging. In this sec-
tion, we prove several properties of the equilibrium policy functions. With those properties,
we can write an equivalent maximization problem, in which fO, fN are replaced by a cutoff
belief ρ̄ and the mean of the distribution of beliefs mρ.
Proposition 6. In a rational expectations equilibrium of the model, xi(ρ; fO, fN) has the
following cutoff property: For any given aggregate state (fO, fN), and i = O,N , there exists
a cutoff belief ρ̄i such that
xi(ρ; fO, fN) =

1 , ρ ≥ ρ̄i
0 , ρ < ρ̄i
.
Furthermore, we always have ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N .
The proof can be found in Appendix 3.5.4. The cutoff property of the policy functions is
rather intuitive. It basically says that, given all other conditions equal, if a producer find it
optimal to use the new technology, then all producers who hold higher beliefs - that the new
technology is reliable - should also find it optimal to use the new technology. And ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N
says that, it is always easier to stick with the current technology, due to the switching costs.
Our goal is to find a tractable replacement of fO, fN on the equilibrium path. Knowing
that the policy functions exhibit cutoff property, an immediate guess would be that the two
measures of beliefs fO, fN are always separating the population distribution of beliefs f by
some cutoff ρ̄. The following proposition of cutoff rule verifies this guess.
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Proposition 7. Suppose the current aggregate state fO, fN are separating the population
distribution of beliefs f by a cutoff ρ̄. Following the policy functions, the next period f ′O, f ′N
must also be separating f ′ by a cutoff ρ̄′.
The proof of the proposition is in Appendix 3.5.5. We start the economy with f 0O = f 0
and fN = 0, which satisfy the cutoff rule. So we can replace the equilibrium dynamics of
fO, fN by the equilibrium dynamics of ρ̄ and f . Remember that from (3.2) we know f t(ρ) is
always a shifting from f 0(ρ). For a large set of distributions, this implies a change of mean,
and we can replace f by its mean mρ. In conclusion, on the equilibrium path, we can use ρ̄
and mρ as state variables instead.
One more thing to be noted before we go to the new maximization problem. The cutoff
property of fO, fN could be violated in off-equilibrium situations. Think about the case
where producers who hold belief ρ are in state N , producers who hold belief ρ̂ are in state
O, but ρ̄O > ρ̂ > ρ > ρ̄N . In the next period, this violation situation will continue, and
presumably for longer periods. This is why we claim that the new maximization problem we
are going to establish, is equivalent to the original one, only in the sense that they generate
exactly the same equilibrium dynamics.
We rewrite the value functions and policy functions under three real-valued state vari-
ables: the individual belief ρ; The cutoff belief ρ̄; And finally, the mean of the population
distribution of beliefs mρ.
Vi(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) : R3 → R;
xi(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) : R3 → {0, 1};
for i = O,N.
Because of the cutoff rule, we can also replace the rational perception of other producers’
actions x̃i, by a rational perception of the future cutoff ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ). It can also be regarded as
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the aggregate policy function. We specify a functional form for
P (ν) = αν+c,
where α ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0.3 And write the following maximization problem.
Taking ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ) as given, a producer with the old technology solves






π + (1− π)αν+c
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VO(ρ








π + (1− π)αν+c
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VN(ρ











ρ′ = ρ+ (−logα)(ν + c); (3.14)
ρ̄′ = ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ); (3.15)
3See a discussion of why we pick this particular functional form in Appendix 3.5.2.
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m′ρ = mρ + (−logα)(ν + c); (3.16)
And taking as given ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ), a producer who is currently with the new technology solves
VN(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) = max
xN∈{0,1}
(
π + (1− π)αν+c
)
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π + (1− π)αν+c
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VN(ρ








V∗∗ = −z∗ + βV∗. (3.18)
I claim that the maximization problem above is equivalent to the original problem, in the
sense that they generate exactly the same equilibrium dynamics. At last, we shall describe
the consistency condition for the rational expectation equilibrium. Define
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ρ̄O(ρ̄,mρ) = min{ρ ∈ R | xO(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) = 1},
ρ̄N(ρ̄,mρ) = min{ρ ∈ R | xN(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) = 1},









+ (−logα)(ν + c). (3.19)
where ν is derived from (3.13).
3.4 Numerical Simulations
We have solved the equilibrium numerically, you can find a detailed discussion of the algo-












that is, a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. In the benchmark parameteri-
zation, we use the following values:
Table 3.1: Benchmark Parameterization
Utility Levels u(θ0) = 0, u(θH) = 1, u(θL) = −15
Probability α = 0.7, c = 0.2
Initial Distribution µ = −2.2, σ = 1
Grid Points N = 101, πmin = 10−7, πmax = 1− πmin
Other β = 0.9, z = z∗ = 1
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We choose the normal distribution in the ρ-space because it has a very good property:
the initial mean of the distribution does not affect the equilibrium, only the initial variance
does. The initial mean will come to play in the simulation part though. We have also tried
with uniform distribution in the π-space, but find no qualitative difference.
Using the solved aggregate policy function ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ), we have simulated the equilibrium
path of adoption rate, starting from different initial means. The basic procedure for sim-





ρ + (−logα)(ν0 + c),
and iterate for T many times. Notice that once (ρ̄t,mtρ) are given, the adoption rate νt can
be calculated from






where Φ is the CDF of a standard normal distribution.
Figure 3.1: Adoption Rate and Evolution of Aggregate State

































The adoption rate curve is clearly S-shaped. And we have this pattern for a large range
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of different initial means.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 The Extensive Form Problem
Though we are not going to solve it directly, let’s write the extensive form maximization
problem of a producer, and the corresponding rational expectations equilibrium(REE).













xt = 1 indicates the choice of the new technology, and remember that the technology has a
time-to-built, so xt will become effective in t+ 1.
The history, which in general is a record of all past events the producer could observe,














too. The second is the history of
all producers’ past choices of technology. Since we are interested in a symmetric equilibrium























as a history, and H t as the set of all possible histories, up to the beginning of period t. We













t) : H t → {0, 1};
πt(h
t) : H t → [0, 1].
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In an REE, the producer should be able to form a rational expectation of future dynamics
of belief measures, which is history-contingent too. Define
{






producer’s rational expectation of future dynamics of belief measures, where
f̃ t+1i (ρ|ht) : H t → F , i = O,N.
Now we can write the maximization problem, for an individual producer who holds initial
belief π0 or equivalently ρ0, and in initial aggregate state (f 0O, f 0N). For notation consistency,
we define x−1 = 0 (= 1) if the producer starts at state O (N), and h0 = .
The producer takes as given a rational expectation
{



































































ρt − logP (νt) , if θt = θH















The first constraint says that, the producer forms a rational expectation of the next
period adoption rate, which directly affects the current choice of xt. The second constraint
says that given ht, which contains f tN , the producer knows for sure the current adoption rate,
which affects belief updating. The third constraint is Bayesian updating, if a high output is
observed, the producer’s belief ρ moves up by −logP (νt). If a low output is observed, it drops
to −∞, and stays there. The last constraint is to transform belief back to a probability.
In equilibrium, the evolution of aggregate state must be consistent with individual’s














t)f ti (ρt); (3.23)
where each ρt+1 corresponds to a ρt based on (3.21). And at last, for the equilibrium to be
a REE, we require that for ∀ t, ∀ ht ∈ H t
f̃ t+1i (ρ|ht) = f t+1i (ρ|ht), ρ ∈ R; i = O,N.
3.5.2 The P (ν) Function
If we think of the experiment as a hypothesis test, 1 − P (ν) would be the power function,
i.e. the probability of rejecting the null (the new technology is reliable) when the alternative
(the new technology is unreliable) is true. We want it to satisfy
−P ′(ν) > 0, lim
ν→∞
1− P (ν) = 1.
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The power of the test should be increasing with its size, and approaches a detection for sure
in the limit.
An extra property we want this power function to have is that, if we run two experiments,
one is with two stages of size ν1 and ν2, the other is with only one stage of size ν1 +ν2. Then
the final belief we get should be the same. In other words, the size of the experiment should
be accumulative.
One can prove that P (ν) = αν is the only continuous function satisfying the property.
To see this, in the first experiment, we update belief in the following manner,
ρ′ = ρ− logP (ν1),
ρ′′ = ρ′ − logP (ν2)
= ρ− logP (ν1)− logP (ν2),
while in the second experiment, we have
ρ̂′′ = ρ− logP (ν1 + ν2).
To such that ρ′′ = ρ̂′′, we need
P (ν1 + ν2) = P (ν1)P (ν2), ∀ ν1, ν2.
This uniquely pins down the functional form for P (ν) = αν , as long as we assume that P (ν)
is continuous. The detection probability is 1− αν then.
Interestingly, this form is an analogue of the detection probability in the canonical
Bayesian learning. Suppose we have the following signal structure, if the new technology is
reliable (unreliable), it produces the bad outcome with probability 0 (1 − a). Now we run
n ∈ Z many i.i.d. experiments, one bad outcome is enough for us to conclude that the new
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technology is unreliable, so the detection probability is 1− an.
However, there are technical difficulties going directly from finitely many producers, to
a continuum of them. Denote N as the total number of producers in the finite case, our ν
resembles lim
n,N→∞
n/N , and we can rewrite 1−an as 1−(aN)n/N . What we want is lim
N→∞
aN = α,
but there is no fixed a making it happen. We need a to go up to 1 as N goes to infinity. In
other words, we need the informativeness of the individual signal, which is determined by
the difference between 0 and 1− a in our case, to diminish when the number of signals goes
up. In the literature, it is common to directly assume P (ν) with a continuum of producers,
rather than to derive it as the limit of some finite cases.
At last, for technical reasons involving the definition of equilibrium, we can’t allow
lim
ν→0+
P (ν) = 1. Thus we choose P (ν) = αν+c, where c > 0 is a constant.4 The func-
tional form doesn’t follow the accumulative property exactly, but it is the closest we can
get.
3.5.3 An Alternative Signal Distribution














when the new technology is unreliable.
We would have
4It is equivalent to P (ν) = cαν , where c ∈ (0, 1).
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ρ′ = ρ+
(ν + c) (θ2L − θ2H)
2σ2
+
(ν + c) (θH − θL)
σ2
Ȳ .
It is still nice and clean, but in this case the belief could move up and down repeatedly,
since there is no absorbing state. We leave it for future research.
3.5.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof consists of two steps. First we are going to prove that VN(ρ; fO, fN)−VO(ρ; fO, fN)
is non-decreasing in ρ. Then we will show that ρ̄i, i = O,N exist, and ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N .
Step1: For any given (fO, fN), the difference term ∆V (ρ; fO, fN) ≡ VN(ρ; fO, fN)−VO(ρ; fO, fN)
is non-decreasing in ρ ∈ R.
To start with, notice that both Vi(ρ; fO, fN), i = O,N are continuous in ρ ∈ R, and
differentiable in ρ ∈ R except for some measure 0 set of points.
In a state i = O producer’s maximization problem, the producer essentially compares
EVO ≡
(
π + (1− π)P (ν)
)
VO(ρ
′; f ′O, f
′










π + (1− π)P (ν)
)
VN(ρ
′; f ′O, f
′





Since we know that
lim
ρ→∞
















We can conclude that EVN > EVO, as ρ → ∞. In other words, there exists a ρ̂O such
that for ∀ ρ ≥ ρ̂O, xO(ρ; fO, fN) = 1. Similarly, we can argue this for xN(ρ; fO, fN) and a
ρ̂N .




, then for ∀ ρ ≥ ρ̂, we have xO(ρ; fO, fN) = xN(ρ; fO, fN) = 1
and
∆V (ρ; fO, fN) =
(
π + (1− π)P (ν)
)




u(θL)− u(θ0) + z,
which is non-decreasing in π (and ρ). Thus ∆V (ρ; fO, fN) is non-decreasing in ρ on [ρ̂,∞).
As for ρ ∈ (−∞, ρ̂), because of the differentiability, we can discuss the slope of ∆V (ρ; fO, fN)
at any point, except for a measure 0 set of points. For any particular ρ, there are three cases
to consider.
Case1: xO(ρ; fO, fN) = xN(ρ; fO, fN) = 0. We have
∆V (ρ; fO, fN) =
(
π + (1− π)P (ν)
)





Obviously it is non-decreasing at such ρ.
Case2: xO(ρ; fO, fN) = xN(ρ; fO, fN) = 1. Same as those ρ ∈ [ρ̂,∞).
Case3: xO(ρ; fO, fN) = 0, xN(ρ; fO, fN) = 1. We have
∆V (ρ; fO, fN) =
(
π + (1− π)P (ν)
)







π + (1− π)P (ν)
)
∆V (ρ′; f ′O, f
′






where ρ′ = ρ − logP (ν). As long as we can prove that ∆V (ρ′; f ′O, f ′N) is non-decreasing at
ρ′, ∆V (ρ; fO, fN) would be non-decreasing at ρ. Also notice that ρ′ is greater than ρ by
−logP (ν) > 0. We can apply the same logic to ∆V (ρ′; f ′O, f ′N) to get a ρ′′, and iterate this
process until we reach some ρn ∈ [ρ̂,∞). Then, use backward induction, we can show that
∆V (ρ; fO, fN) is non-decreasing at this ρ.
Note that xO(ρ; fO, fN) = 1, xN(ρ; fO, fN) = 0 is trivially impossible. So by its continu-
ity, we can conclude that ∆V (ρ; fO, fN) is non-decreasing in ρ ∈ R.
Step2: For any given (fO, fN), the cutoff beliefs ρ̄i, i = O,N exist, and ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N .
Let’s prove it for the state i = O producers first. To show that ρ̄O exists, it suffices to
show that suppose xO(ρ1; fO, fN) = 1 and ρ2 > ρ1, then xO(ρ2; fO, fN) = 1 too.













π1 + (1− π1)P (ν)
.
Now with a larger ρ2, the LHS changes to ∆V (ρ′2; f ′O, f ′N) where ρ′2 > ρ′1. Since we














π2 + (1− π2)P (ν)
,














π2 + (1− π1)P (ν)
must hold, and xO(ρ2; fO, fN) = 1. That concludes our proof for the existence of ρ̄O.
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Proof for ρ̄N follows the same logic, so we omit it here. What’s left is to show that
ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N . The proof is straightforward, remember that a state i = O producer compares
EVO and EVN . If we define the corresponding terms for a state i = N producer, ÊV O and
ÊV N , we can easily check that
EVO > ÊV O ; EVN < ÊV N .
This implies that if a state i = O producer finds it optimal to adopt the new technology,
then a state i = N producer, who is otherwise holding the same belief and in a same aggregate
state, must also find it optimal to keep using the new technology. This immediately gives us
ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N . QED
3.5.5 Proof of Proposition 7
By Theorem 1, we know the existence of ρ̄O and ρ̄N . Based on the values of them and the
current cutoff ρ̄, there are three cases possible.
Case1: ρ̄ > ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N . Remember that producers with belief ρ ∈ (−∞, ρ̄) are currently in
state i = O. Since ρ̄ > ρ̄O, those state i = O producers with belief ρ ∈ [ρ̄O, ρ̄) will switch to
the new technology. And the next period cutoff is
ρ̄′ = ρ̄O − logP (ν),
the adoption rate increases.
Case2: ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄ ≥ ρ̄N . In this case, neither state i = O or state i = N producer would want
to change their current technology, and the next period cutoff is
ρ̄′ = ρ̄− logP (ν),
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the adoption rate doesn’t change.
Case3: ρ̄O ≥ ρ̄N > ρ̄. In this case, state i = N producers with belief ρ ∈ [ρ̄, ρ̄N) will switch
back to the old technology. And the next period cutoff is
ρ̄′ = ρ̄N − logP (ν),
the adoption rate decreases.
We are confident that the Case3 won’t happen on equilibrium path. But nevertheless,
Proposition 2 holds, on equilibrium or off equilibrium path. QED
3.5.6 Algorithm for Numerical Solution
The model is solved numerically using a hybrid of value function iteration and policy function
iteration technics. The algorithm contains two loops, the inner loop conducts value function
iteration. While fixing the current guess of the aggregate policy function ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ), the inner
loop iterates on the two value functions VO(ρ; ρ̄,mρ), VN(ρ; ρ̄,mρ), until they both converge.
The outer loop conducts policy function iteration. It uses the converged value functions to
generate a new aggregate policy function. Remember that those value functions are derived
from the inner loop while fixing the current guess of the aggregate policy function. If the
new aggregate policy function and the current guess of aggregate policy function are close
enough, we are done.
Here are some more details. First, the state space is discretized. Originally, these three
state variables ρ, ρ̄, mρ ∈ R, while their counterparts π, π̄, mπ ∈ [0, 1]. We take an even
grid in the π-space, that is, N grid points between some [πmin, πmax]. Then we use the
logit transformation to get a corresponding uneven grid in the ρ-space. Thus in the loop,
VO(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) and VN(ρ; ρ̄,mρ) are stored as N ×N ×N matrices, while ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ) is stored as
a N ×N matrix.
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Second, to avoid coarseness from discretization, we allow the ρ̃′(ρ̄,mρ) matrix to take
values in R (or in [0, 1], depending on its format). And when we need to map the value back
on the grid, we use linear interpolation. For example, suppose ρ̃′ ∈
[












or use πgrid instead, when its format is a π̃′.
As in any typical iteration algorithm, we calculate the differences between the current
guess of function and the newly derived function. When the distance, defined as the maxi-
mum absolute value of the differences, is small enough, we have ourselves a fixed point and
that gives us the numerical solution. Since they are all real-valued functions, the convergence
criteria for the value functions and the aggregate policy function are certain thresholds. The
threshold for the value function iteration is set to be 10−7. And the convergence in the value
function iteration is universal, cause it is a contraction mapping.
The convergence in the policy function iteration is complicated though, we don’t get
universal convergence. At most of the grid points, convergence is achieved within a few
rounds of iteration. But at some of the grid points, we find the aggregate policy function
oscillate. For example, with N = 101 and 100 rounds of iteration, we end up with large
differences5 at 36 out of 1012 grid points. And along the way, the set of grid points at which
the differences are large becomes stable. Here is a graph of the maximum difference6 during
the 100 rounds of iteration.
5A difference is regarded as large if its absolute value is no less than 10−3.
6In terms of the absolute value of course. In this numerical exercise, they are all achieved at the same
grid point, except for the first few rounds of iteration.
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Figure 3.2: Maximum Difference during Iterations











Path of Max Distance b/w Cutoff and Updated Cutoff
Number of the Cutoff Function Iteration
Those grid points at which the aggregate policy function oscillates, though being a very
small portion of the total grid points, could jeopardize our simulation if they were on the
equilibrium path. So the next task is to show that they are never visited, unless we start the
economy there. We run several simulations, by varying the mean of the initial distribution
from ρ = −2.2 (π = 0.1) to ρ = 0 (π = 0.5). In each simulation, we record the differences
along the equilibrium path of state. It turns out that those differences never exceed a scale
of 10−6. Here is a graph of them when the initial mean is ρ = −2.2 (π = 0.1).
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Figure 3.3: Errors along the Equilibrium Path












−7 Potential Errors on the Eqm Path
time
We conclude that the simulation results are valid, though we don’t get universal conver-
gence with the aggregate policy function. We could also reach such conclusion by switching
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